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Disclaimer
It is important to set out a number of disclaimers at the outset 
of this paper. The research is based on an online survey of 
Facebook fans of populist parties across Europe. The results, 
therefore, do not necessarily reflect the views of the parties or 
groups mentioned in this paper. All references in this paper 
to ‘supporters’ of populist groups refer to our sample of social 
media supporters. How far our sample represents these parties’ 
offline supporter base is something we discuss in detail.
This paper is an attempt to get a clearer understanding 
of the motivations, concerns and attitudes of online supporters 
of populist parties across Europe, and to understand the 
relationship between offline and online activism. Given the 
growing importance and significance of social media as a tool 
of organisation, recruitment and proselytising, we believe this 
sample alone is of unique value and significance.
Finally, it must be recognised that this paper is a 
preliminary investigation, and not a definitive work. It is 
based on an innovative method of data collection, which has 
both strengths and weaknesses. These are acknowledged, and 
are discussed at length, but should be borne in mind when 
interpreting any findings. Given the collapsing response rates 
of traditional survey mediums, and the inherent problems of 
representativeness in any social survey, the generation of new 
data sets through social media is likely to be an important area 
of methodological innovation in the years to come. We welcome 
the chance to contribute to the debate around this new method 
of inquiry, and embrace any comment, critique and debate 
capable of improving the methodology applied here.
Demos is an independent think-tank that is committed 
to undertaking innovative research in areas of public interest. 
We are non-party political. Our results are set out objectively 
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and accurately, without normative judgement, something that 
is often lacking when discussing this subject.
We would like to thank those who took the time to 
respond to our survey. We hope this work fairly and honestly 
reflects their views.
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executive summary
Over the last decade, populist parties have been growing in 
strength across Western Europe. These parties are defined by 
their opposition to immigration and concern for protecting 
national and European culture, sometimes using the language 
of human rights and freedom. On economic policy, they are 
often critical of globalisation and the effects of international 
capitalism on workers’ rights. This is combined with ‘anti-
establishment’ rhetoric and language. Often called ‘populist 
extremist parties’ or ‘the new right’, these parties do not fit 
easily into the traditional political divides.
Their growth over the past decade has been remarkable. 
Formerly on the political fringes, these parties now command 
significant political weight in the parliaments of Austria, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Latvia and Slovakia, as well as the European Parliament. In 
some countries, they are the second or third largest party and 
are seen as necessary members of many conservative coalition 
governments.
The growth of these movements is mirrored online. 
Populist parties are adept at using social media to amplify 
their message, recruit and organise. Indeed, the online social 
media following on Facebook and elsewhere for many of these 
groups often dwarfs their formal membership, consisting 
of tens of thousands of sympathisers and supporters. This 
mélange of virtual and real-world political activity is the 
way millions of people — especially young people — relate to 
politics in the twenty-first century. This nascent, messy and 
more ephemeral form of politics is becoming the norm for a 
younger, digital generation.
Yet despite their growth and obvious importance no 
one has ever investigated these online supporters. This is the 
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In total, 12,320 people responded to our survey, ranging 
from 143 returns from the supporters of the Bloc Identitaire 
to 2,564 from supporters of the Austrian Freedom Party. 
Following the removal of data that were either corrupt, 
intentionally misleading, or incomplete, a final data set of 
10,667 survey responses was produced.
The results were weighted against the groups’ online 
demographics available through Facebook’s advertising tool. 
This was done in order to improve the validity and accuracy 
of any inferences made in respect of the online population. 
Although online recruitment in social research is widespread, 
self-select recruitment via social network sites brings novel 
challenges. Because this is an innovative research method 
with both strengths and weaknesses, we have included an 
in-depth discussion of the methodology in annex 1.
In chapter 1, we present a brief background to the 
emergence of populist parties and movements (henceforth 
PPAMs) across Europe. While often described as ‘far right’, 
the ideology of many of these groups represents a mixture of 
leftwing and rightwing political and economic beliefs with 
populist rhetoric and policy.
In chapter 2, we outline the demographic makeup of the 
PPAMs under investigation. This includes members’ gender, 
age, education level and employment status. We also explore 
the extent to which online supporters vote for these parties 
(where applicable), consider themselves formal members or 
attend demonstrations.
In chapter 3, we present supporters’ reasons for joining a 
PPAM. This is based on over 5,000 open text responses from 
supporters explaining, in their own words, their reasons and 
motivations for membership. The results are discussed in the 
context of existing academic literature on the subject.
In chapters 4 and 5, we present the social and  
political views of online supporters, and their levels of trust 
in political and social institutions including the national 
government, the media and the EU. Comparisons are  
made against national averages using data available from 
other surveys.
first quantitative investigation into these digital populists, 
based on over 10,000 survey responses from 11 countries and 
includes data on who they are, what they think, and what 
motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world activism. 
It also provides new insight into how populism — and politics 
and political engagement more generally — is changing as a 
result of social media.
methodology
The survey data presented in this report were collected by 
targeting the Facebook fans of each of the following groups: 
Bloc Identitaire (‘Identity Block’; France), the British National 
Party (UK), CasaPound Italia (Italy), the Dansk Folkeparti 
(‘Danish People’s Party’; Denmark), the English Defence 
League (UK), the Front National (‘National Front’; France), the 
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV or ‘Dutch Party for Freedom’; the 
Netherlands), Die Freiheit (‘Freedom’; Germany), Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs (FPO or ‘Austrian Freedom Party’; Austria), 
the Fremskrittspartiet (‘Norwegian Progress Party’; Norway), 
Lega Nord (‘Northern League’; Italy), Perussuomalaiset 
(‘True Finns’; Finland), Sverigedemokraterna (‘Sweden 
Democrats’; Sweden) and Vlaams Belang (‘Flemish Interest’; 
Belgium). A short description of each of these groups is 
provided in annex 2 at the back of this report.
The Jobbik movement in Hungary was also surveyed, but 
the results are not included in the current data set for reasons of 
comparability. A report on this data is forthcoming.
Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread 
and popular social media site in Western Europe; populist 
parties have a sizeable presence on this site; and it allows for 
precise and highly targeted advertising. For three months in 
the summer of 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals who 
were supporters of these groups on Facebook. On clicking the 
advert, individuals were redirected to a survey that they were 
invited to complete. The survey and adverts were presented in 
the appropriate language, and were then translated back into 
English for the purposes of this report.
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Finally, in chapter 6 we present the results of our logistic 
regression models exploring the relationship between online 
support and offline activities. We examine the extent to which 
online supporters vote (where applicable) for these parties, are 
formal members, or participate in demonstrations and street 
marches. We also examine which background characteristics 
and attitudes are correlated with increased likelihood of 
offline engagement. Because of their size, the full regression 
outputs are not included in this paper but are available to 
download from the Demos website (www.demos.co.uk).
Results
The results reveal new insights into the social media world of 
these groups:
· Online supporters are primarily young men: an average of 63 per 
cent are under 30, and 75 per cent are male. In no country do 
females make up more than 36 per cent of online supporters. 
Even when compared against the national demographics of 
Facebook users in each country, supporters of PPAMs are 
younger, and more likely to be male.
· Online supporters are slightly more likely to be unemployed. On 
average, 14 per cent are unemployed, compared with an 
aggregate national average of around 7 per cent. However, 
given the young age demographic of our sample, this is 
probably not much higher than average. Nearly a third (30 per 
cent) of online supporters are students.
· Online supporters are not just armchair activists: many are party 
members and voters and they are more likely to demonstrate than 
the national average. For political parties, 67 per cent of online 
supporters voted for the party at the last general or national 
election, although only 32 per cent define themselves as formal 
members. Although only a minority report having been 
involved in protests or demonstrations (26 per cent), this is 
significantly higher than the EU average, which is under  
10 per cent.
· Supporters are motivated by positive identification with the party’s 
values and the desire to protect national and cultural identity. Many 
join or support PPAMs because they fear that immigration 
and multiculturalism are destroying national (and sometimes 
European) values and culture. There are high levels of 
disillusionment with mainstream politics, and greater trust 
in PPAM leaders who speak their mind. Our research finds 
little evidence of economics being a driving factor of support, 
contrary to previous research and common explanations in 
public discourse.
· Younger supporters are more likely to cite immigration than older 
supporters as a reason for joining. Twenty per cent of those aged 
16-20 cite immigration as the reason they join or support 
populist groups, compared with 10 per cent of over 50s. This is 
contrary to the common perception that older people tend to 
be more opposed to immigration.
· Supporters display low levels of trust in both national and European 
political institutions compared with national population averages. 
While online supporters have only slightly lower levels of 
‘generalised trust’ (trust in other people) than the national 
average, they are much more distrustful of national and 
European political institutions. Only 20 per cent online 
supporters trust the national government (compared with 
43 per cent across Europe); and only 14 per cent trust the 
European Union (compared with 44 per cent overall).
· Compared with national population averages, supporters of PPAMs 
have low levels of trust in the justice system, but average levels of trust 
in the police and army. Online supporters display shockingly 
low levels of trust in their own country’s judicial system. An 
average of only 30 per cent trust the justice system, compared 
with 60 per cent nationally. However, PPAM supporters are 
just as likely to express trust in the police and army as the rest 
of the country’s population.
· Online supporters are disgruntled democrats: they overwhelmingly 
believe that voting matters, and disavow violence, but do not 
believe that politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns. 
On average, only 16 per cent of respondents agreed that 
‘it does not matter who you vote for’. While supporters of 
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street-based groups in the UK and Italy were more likely to 
express disillusionment in the act of voting, the pattern does 
not hold in France. However, only just over a third of online 
supporters felt that politics was an effective way to respond to 
their concerns. On average, 26 per cent of online supporters 
agreed that ‘violence is acceptable if it leads to the right ends’. 
This does not, of course, necessarily mean that this quarter of 
supporters will undertake violence, and comparisons with the 
general population are not possible.
· Online supporters display average levels of personal optimism, 
but very low levels of optimism about their country’s future. 
Considering their rhetoric and concerns over immigration, 
crime and the loss of culture, it is surprising that online 
populist supporters tend to be optimistic when it comes to 
their own personal lives: 27 per cent thought their lives would 
improve in the next 12 months compared with a European 
average of 26 per cent. However, only 10 per cent of online 
supporters thought that their country was ‘on the right track’, 
compared with an average of 28 per cent across EU countries.
· Online populist supporters are highly critical of the European Union, 
with many blaming it for a loss of control over borders and the 
erosion of cultural identity. Compared with European population 
averages, PPAM supporters are far more likely to associate the 
EU with ‘not enough control over external borders’ and ‘loss 
of cultural identity’.
· The shift from online activism to voting is motivated by concerns 
over immigration, and Islamic extremism. Supporters who 
listed immigration as a top concern were 109 per cent more 
likely to vote for a populist party than those who did not list 
immigration, while those who listed Islamic extremism as a top 
concern were 85 per cent more likely to vote for a populist party 
than those who did not. Women supporters were 52 per cent 
more likely to vote for populist political parties, when other 
demographic and attitudinal characteristics were held constant.
· The shift from online activism to becoming a party member is 
motivated by concerns over multiculturalism and the belief that 
politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns. Supporters 
who listed multiculturalism as a top concern were 32 per cent 
more likely to ‘formally’ join a populist political party than 
those who did not list it. Supporters who thought that politics 
was an effective way to respond to their concerns were 42 per 
cent more likely to be ‘formal’ members. Men and women were 
equally likely to be a ‘formal’ member.
· The shift from online activism to street protesting is motivated by 
concerns over corruption, and correlated with gender, as well as 
views on politics and violence. Corruption appears to be more 
of a motivating factor than either immigration or Islamic 
extremism when it comes to online supporters taking to the 
streets in protest. Those who cited corruption as a top concern 
were 38 per cent more likely to demonstrate than those who 
did not. Men are 16 per cent more likely to participate in a 
street demonstration. Interestingly, those who think politics 
is an effective form of redress were 23 per cent more likely 
to demonstrate, while those who thought that violence was 
acceptable if it leads to the right outcome were 37 per cent 
more likely to demonstrate.
implications
Given the pan-European nature of our results and the 
importance of the national and local context, specific 
recommendations are not possible. This is an interim paper, so 
we limit our implications section to a small number of general 
comments. Country-specific papers will be released in the 
coming weeks with greater detail and nuance.
It is clear that a significant number of Europeans are 
concerned about the erosion of their national culture in the 
face of immigration, the growth of Islam in Europe, and 
the blurring of national borders as a result of European 
integration and globalisation. These concerns are likely to 
remain, if not grow, in the coming years.
Similarly, the influence of social media will continue to 
change our understanding of social and political movements. 
In the past, attempts to understand emerging political 
movements were limited to the pronouncements of party 
leaders and formal party members. Little attention has been 
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politics is not currently seen as an effective way to respond 
to their needs. Populist supporters have lost faith in national 
governments, the European Union, and the justice system. 
In this, they shadow the general trend of falling confidence 
across the public as a whole in political institutions. Restoring 
confidence in civic institutions must be part of any response. 
Importantly, those online activists who are also involved in 
offline activism — voting, demonstrating, or being part of a 
political party — appear to be more democratic, have more 
faith in politics, and are more likely to disavow violence. This 
is powerful evidence that encouraging more people to become 
actively involved in political and civic life, whatever their 
political persuasion, is an important way forward.
paid to the role of online activists. This needs to change. 
Online supporters of populist movements represent a whole 
new generation of predominantly young activists, who far 
outnumber the formal members of these parties. And their 
involvement extends offline: they tend to vote for the parties 
they like, and are far more likely to get involved in political 
activism compared with the general public. Understanding 
who these people are, their background and activities, will be 
key to understanding new political movements, and whether 
they are likely to grow or fade.
This work was commissioned before the terrorist attacks 
in Norway in July 2011; and the majority of the research was 
undertaken before then. Norway was added to the sample 
following the attacks. Whether or not these terrible events will 
have a modifying effect on European populism is not clear. 
It is to be noted, however, that in many respects the responses 
from supporters of the Norwegian Progress Party were the 
most moderate of all groups surveyed.
This tragic event underscored the fact that a tiny number 
of people are prepared to pursue some of the arguments of 
populist groups to violent extremes. This does not mean 
that supporters of populist parties are inclined to violence: 
our research shows they are not. Nor is this a problem 
that is limited to populist or nationalist groups. However, 
the attacks highlight the potential for extreme rhetoric to 
lead some individuals to conclude that violence is the only 
answer. Certainly, some populist groups convey a sense 
that the existence of Europe itself is at stake (often citing 
demographics and high immigrant birth rates), and that 
mainstream society, politicians and the media are either 
ignorant to the threat or complicit. Mainstream politicians 
need to respond: addressing concerns over immigration and 
cultural identity, without succumbing to xenophobic solutions. 
Not shutting these parties or their supporters out as beyond the 
pale, but engaging and debating forcefully with them.
Finally, the research suggests that many supporters 
of populist parties have extremely low levels of trust and 
confidence in mainstream political institutions — for them 
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1  Background: the new 
european populists
 
In June 2009, an unknown group calling itself the English 
Defence League (EDL) organised a protest march in the town 
of Luton, just outside London. The march was in response to 
the planned demonstration of a now-banned radical Muslim 
group — Al Muhajiroun — against the Afghan war and the 
British Armed Forces. The EDL members, many draped in 
the cross of St George, claimed to be defending England and 
English culture against ‘Sharia law’ and ‘radical Muslims’. 
The following year, Geert Wilders of the Dutch Freedom party 
took 16 per cent of the vote in the Dutch national elections, 
and the Swedish Democrats entered Swedish parliament for 
the first time.
These seemingly unrelated events are emblematic of a 
seismic shift in European politics — the emergence of a growing 
cast of activists, street groups and political parties which are 
often grouped together under the label ‘populist extremist 
parties’,1 ‘far-right’ parties 2 or the ‘new right’. These groups 
now number at least several distinct parties and movements,3 
and while most are not formally aligned, there appears to be 
a growing trend towards informal alliances between them, 
including expressions of mutual support and the sharing of 
electoral tactics.
Despite being referred to as ‘far-right’, many of these 
groups are not easily placed according to traditional political 
categories, often combining elements of leftwing and rightwing 
philosophy, mixed with populist language and rhetoric.
What they share in common is a deep concern 
about maintaining national (and sometimes European) 
identity, which they see as under threat from high levels of 
immigration — especially from Muslim majority countries. 
They tend to agree that multiculturalism has been an 
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the welfare state and strenuously denying anti-Semitism.4 
She describes her position on immigration in France as 
‘nothing to do with racism, it’s an economic problem’. She 
protests at the ‘Islamification’ of France and says that she 
wants to defend republican values, feminism and secularism 
from Muslim extremists. Opinion polls suggest that these 
messages are resonating. A March 2011 opinion poll put 
Marine Le Pen at 23 per cent, two points ahead of President 
Sarkozy, suggesting that she could win the first round of the 
2012 presidential election.
There have also been significant gains for anti-immigrant 
parties in Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. Italy’s leading 
anti-immigration party, Lega Nord (‘the Northern League’), 
has seen its support more than double since 2005, polling at 
12.7 per cent in 2010; it is now seen as a crucial member of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s ruling coalition. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilder’s 
‘Freedom Party’, founded in 2004, now holds 24 out of 150 seats 
in the Dutch Parliament and received 16 per cent of the vote in 
2010. Wilders has called for a ban on the Koran, describing it 
as the ‘Islamic Mein Kampf’.5 He styles his critique of Islam 
as a defence of human rights, questioning Islam’s stance on 
women’s and gay rights, and saying that he is only ‘intolerant 
of the intolerant’.6 Although it is not a formal member of the 
current coalition, the Dutch Government relies on the Freedom 
Party for support. In Austria, in early 2011 the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ), led by Heinz Christian Strache, evidenced support 
through opinion polls of around 24–29 per cent, on a par with 
the two major mainstream parties.
Similarly, the rise of anti-immigrant, nationalist parties 
has been pronounced in Scandinavian countries, typically 
seen as bastions of leftwing and liberal social policy. Indeed, 
the terrorist attacks in Norway this summer have led to a good 
deal of introspection about the rise of ‘far right’ anti-immigrant 
groups, largely as Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist, was 
a member of the Norwegian Progress Party before becoming 
disillusioned with their moderate approach.
In Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s 
Party) claims to defend the independence of Denmark, both 
unmitigated failure and argue for restrictions on new 
immigrants, greater emphasis on integration and assimilation 
and, in some cases, repatriation of immigrants who ‘refuse 
to integrate’ or whose cultures are seen as in conflict with 
Western European values. Some have shifted from traditional 
far-right concerns about race to more nuanced positions 
relating to values and culture. Many find common cause in 
opposing a perceived Islamification of secular liberal and 
Christian societies. These groups lay claim to the mantle of 
the Enlightenment, espousing support for the fundamentally 
liberal values of free speech, democracy and equality, which 
they seek to defend from the threat of Islam.
On economic policy, however, the current economic 
climate has also heightened rhetoric beyond national cultural 
protection to include national economic interests, and workers’ 
rights — typically the language of the left. These groups are 
increasingly critical of the European Union, international 
capitalism and globalisation.
They are also, indubitably, populists with a broad distrust 
of ‘elites’ and ‘the establishment’, which they believe have 
allowed immigration to flourish and national cultures to be 
threatened. Banker bailouts, as well as media and political 
scandals, have left many Europeans hostile to the status quo 
and desiring significant changes. They present themselves as 
the voice of ‘the people’ against ‘the elites’, as outsiders brave 
enough to say the uncomfortable, politically incorrect truth.
These groups defy simple categorisation. We refer to them 
throughout as populist parties and movements (PPAMs).
Populist political parties
Populist political parties are enjoying unprecedented electoral 
success and growing membership. In the last decade, many 
have moved from the fringes of society to become integral 
members of coalition governments and important political 
forces, capable of shifting mainstream political debate.
In France, Marine Le Pen is reforming the French Front 
National party, styling herself as a defender of the republic and 
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Populist street movements
In addition to the rise of populist political parties, street 
protest movements have also appeared and are growing, 
advocating similar policies. The most notable and active of 
these groups in Western Europe include the English Defence 
League in the UK, Bloc Identitaire in France, and CasaPound 
Italia in Italy. These groups prefer organising protests, street 
marches and other modes of direct activism over formal 
political engagement. They rely heavily on the internet and 
social media to convey their message, build their following and 
organise events. Many of their demonstrations are marked by 
violence, often provoked by counterdemonstrations of anti-
fascist groups.
The English Defence League (EDL) is the largest and 
most well-known populist street-based group, but it is relatively 
new, having been founded only in 2009. The EDL’s mission 
statement specifies the group’s fundamental aim is to uphold 
a commitment to human rights, support for democracy, 
opposition to Sharia law, the creation of an ‘open and honest’ 
discussion about the threats posed by Islamism, maintenance 
of traditional English culture, and solidarity with similarly 
minded governments of foreign countries which are united 
against the ‘global Jihad’. While the organisation increasingly 
casts its objectives in the language of human rights, its  
critics have consistently asserted that the group is racist  
and Islamophobic.
France’s Bloc Identitaire and Italy’s CasaPound Italia 
both emerged much earlier than the EDL, in 2003. Founded 
by Fabrice Roberts, a former member of the dissolved Unité 
Radicale party, Bloc Identitaire campaigns against the 
Islamisation of Europe, illegal immigration and ‘anti-white’ 
racism.10 One of their major initiatives was the launch of a 
brand of soupe au cochon (pork soup) at a Parisian soup 
kitchen, aimed at excluding Muslims.11 The group calls itself 
‘identitarian’, not nationalist, as it defends regional and 
European identity as well as national identity, and distinguishes 
itself from other PPAMs through its pro-Europe stance and its 
focus on non-electoral political campaigning.
from the threats of foreign cultures and what it takes to be 
the sovereignty-eroding aspirations of the European Union. 
It explicitly renounces the idea of Denmark as a multiethnic 
society: ‘Denmark is not an immigrant country and never 
has been.’7  While support for immigration is higher in 
Sweden, the Sweden Democrats in 2010 achieved enough 
votes — 5.7 per cent — to gain representation in the Swedish 
parliament for the first time. The Sweden Democrats advocate 
heavy restrictions on immigration and incentives for current 
immigrants to return to their home countries. They claim that 
their slogan — ‘Keep Sweden Swedish’ –is not about racism 
but the rejection of multiculturalism. The ‘True Finns’, who 
recently renamed themselves ‘The Finns’, are less outspoken on 
issues of immigration and Islam, but nonetheless are proudly 
nationalistic, tough on immigration and highly sceptical of 
the European Union. The Eurozone crisis has buoyed their 
electoral support, with a recent Taloustutkimus opinion poll 
(conducted in April 2011) giving them 15.4 per cent of the vote 
compared with 6.8 per cent support in March 2010.
Moreover, national opinion polls obscure the fact that 
these groups and political parties are cultivating pockets of 
even higher levels of support in certain parts of their respective 
countries. For example, until last year, the British National 
Party was the official opposition in the council in the outer 
London borough of Barking and Dagenham. Other research 
suggests that support for European populist parties and 
groups is higher in areas that are adjacent to large Muslim 
communities.8 As a result, the tactics of many of these groups 
is to focus on achieving success in local and regional elections, 
and then seeking to build a stronger national profile from the 
ground up — as is the case with the National Democratic Party 
(NPD) party in Germany, the Sweden Democrats, and a new 
Danish party called the Danskerne’s Parti.9
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CasaPound Italia is a prominent far-right youth street 
organisation in Italy that takes its name from the American 
expatriate and prolific author Ezra Pound, a defender 
of fascism and supporter of his resident Italy during the 
Second World War. It began in 2003 with the occupation of 
a state-owned building in Rome by student right-wingers. 
CasaPound Italia’s occupied spaces have been, and continue 
to be, sites of communal engagement — for political discussion, 
sports and musical performance, prominently centred 
around the band ZetaZeroAlfa, which features CasaPound 
Italia’s leader, Gianluca Iannone. Their policy positions 
and rhetoric are grounded in economic populism — being 
sceptical of the free market when it does not work in the best 
interest of Italian workers. This is infused with rebellious 
anti-statist contrarianism, all alongside traditional family 
values. CasaPound Italia has been extremely successful at 
mobilising poor, angry, white Italians. Casting themselves 
as ‘Third Millenium Fascists’, members emphasise their ties 
to Mussolini’s ideology while simultaneously presenting 
themselves as serious contributors to contemporary political 
discourse and policy reform.
Populism in a digital age
Our research presented in this report adds to the emerging 
picture of European populist supporters, with a particular 
focus on the type of person who expresses their support for 
these groups through social media sites. The internet is deeply 
ingrained in the strategy and identity of these new PPAMs. 
They use it to promote and disseminate their ideology, recruit 
new members, organise events and present ‘facts’ about 
immigration and Islam, among other topics. Until now, social 
science research has ignored the distinct category of online 
supporters of groups such as these when trying to understand 
new political movements. This is the new face of politics and 
political expression, and will increasingly become an object of 
interest and research to social scientists.
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2  who are the online 
populists?
 
 
Support for populist parties and movements (PPAMs) has 
been growing online as well as offline.
In many cases, the Facebook membership of these 
organisations is larger than the formal membership. For 
example, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), or 
Austrian Freedom Party, claims approximately 40,000 
formal members — but has twice as many Facebook fans. 
Similarly, the British National Party (BNP) has just under 
15,000 formal members and over 80,000 Facebook fans. 
Yet to date, no systematic study has been undertaken to 
investigate who these online populists are.
The rise of social media has created a novel way of 
expressing allegiance to a person, organisation or idea. 
Individuals can show support or become a ‘member’ of any 
one of thousands of groups with just the click of a mouse. 
This raises a host of questions about the strength of affinity 
to online groups, and the relationship between online and 
offline involvement.
Offline, previous research has shown that arguments 
by PPAMs are resonating with men — both very young and 
very old — those with few educational qualifications, and the 
lower middle and working classes.12 According to Mathew 
Goodwin, it was the mix of appealing to both the lower 
middle classes, as well as skilled and unskilled workers that 
has resulted in the growth and electoral success of these 
movements across Europe. These are the segments of society 
that are most likely to feel economically insecure in the 
current climate and threatened by the perceived economic 
and cultural impact of immigration. Yet, there has been very 
little research if any that analyses the distinct category of 
online supporters of these groups.
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In this chapter, we set out some of the background 
demographic data on who online PPAM supporters are and 
the extent of their offline activity.
Demographics
It is possible to identify the makeup of a group’s Facebook 
membership by total size, age and gender by using Facebook’s 
own (publicly available) advertising tool (see methodology 
in annex 1 for details). By way of comparison, in table 1 we 
show the gender and age breakdown of the total population 
of Facebook users for the countries containing the groups 
targeted, which are presented in brackets.
Table 1   size, age and gender of members of PPams who use Facebook  
   in countries investigated
size of group males 
(country 
total) (%)
Females 
(country 
total) (%)
ages 16–20 
(country total) (%)
ages 21–25 
(country total) (%)
Bloc Identitaire 2,340 78 (49) 22 (51) 33 (21) 18 (19)
British National Party 82,700 79 (49) 21 (51) 39 (19) 23 (18)
CasaPound Italia 16,200 87 (54) 13 (46) 25 (18) 22 (17)
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
15,640 64 (49) 36 (51) 24 (18) 17 (14)
Die Freiheit 4,280 79 (52) 21 (48) 13 (22) 13 (21)
English Defence League 38,200 81 (49) 19 (51) 36 (19) 24 (18)
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
84,700 69 (52) 31 (48) 37 (23) 25 (20)
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
64,860 64 (50) 36 (50) 13 (17) 13 (15)
Front National 34,960 79 (49) 21 (51) 47 (21) 21 (19)
Lega Nord 45,740 78 (54) 22 (46) 45 (18) 24 (17)
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
7,140 77 (49) 23 (51) 19 (18) 18 (17)
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
15,640 74 (47) 26 (53) 21 (19) 16 (17)
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
16,660 74 (49) 26 (51) 63 (18) 14 (16)
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
6,970 75 (51) 25 (49) 29 (19) 20 (17)
Total group numbers 436,030
Total averages 75 (50) 25 (50) 32 (19) 19 (17)
ages 26–30 
(country total) (%)
ages 31–40 
(country total) (%)
ages 41–50 
(country total) (%)
ages 51+ 
(country total) (%)
Bloc Identitaire 15 (15) 15 (21) 9 (12) 9 (12)
British National Party 11 (14) 13 (21) 10 (15) 4 (13)
CasaPound Italia 15 (14) 20 (25) 11 (16) 6 (10)
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
10 (11) 19 (21) 17 (17) 13 (17)
Die Freiheit 14 (16) 24 (20) 21 (14) 15 (8)
English Defence League 12 (14) 14 (21) 10 (15) 4 (13)
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
15 (16) 14 (20) 6 (13) 3 (8)
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
10 (13) 21 (22) 23 (17) 20 (16)
Front National 9 (15) 10 (21) 6 (12) 7 (12)
Lega Nord 10 (14) 12 (25) 5 (16) 3 (10)
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
13 (14) 22 (21) 18 (16) 10 (15)
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
17 (15) 23 (22) 13 (14) 10 (13)
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
6 (12) 9 (21) 4 (16) 5 (17)
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
14 (14) 15 (22) 12 (15) 11 (13)
Total averages 12 (14) 17 (21) 12 (15) 8 (13)
There are a number of factors that lead to variation in 
the size of the online presence of these groups, which do not 
necessarily reflect their size in the real world. For example, 
overall internet and social media use varies from country 
to country, as does the uptake of Facebook usage by age. 
There are also issues inherent in our method and approach 
that could lead to variation, which are covered in full in the 
methodology section to this report.
Nevertheless, some interesting trends emerge. While 
across Facebook there is an even gender split, supporters 
of PPAMs are overwhelmingly male (75 per cent compared 
with 25 per cent). Given the even national split on Facebook, 
the disproportionate number of men cannot be claimed 
to be a result of men being more active online in general. 
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education and employment
Education-related data cannot be accessed using Facebook’s 
open access advertising tool. We therefore asked respondents 
to specify their highest level of educational achievement. While 
the results are complicated by the varying education systems 
across the countries surveyed, they do provide some insight 
into the educational achievement of PPAM supporters.
Across our research sample, an average of 45 per 
cent of supporters cited a school qualification (eg GCSE 
or A-level) as their highest level of education (sd=18). 
Meanwhile, 53 per cent indicated that they were educated 
to college or university level or had attained a vocational 
qualification (sd=19).
The Sweden Democrats had the highest proportion 
of supporters with only a school qualification (82 per cent; 
n=567). This is likely to be at least partially explained by the 
relative youth of Sweden Democrats supporters (63 per cent 
were below 21; n=567). By way of comparison, Norwegian 
Progress Party supporters, on average the oldest group 
surveyed, were far less likely to specify a school qualification 
as their highest educational achievement (21 per cent; n=909). 
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) online supporters had the lowest 
propensity to have achieved only a school qualification — only 
19 per cent had done so — while 80 per cent had been either 
educated to university or college level, or had attained a 
vocational qualification (n=335). This was the case despite the 
fact that online PVV supporters did not tend to be particularly 
young — 50 per cent were over 30 (n=7,140).
We also asked respondents whether they were 
employed, unemployed or a student (table 2). On average, 
54 per cent of supporters classified themselves as employed 
(sd=12) while 14 per cent described themselves as unemployed 
(sd=5) and 30 per cent described themselves as students 
(sd=11). BNP online supporters reported the highest level of 
unemployment — 22 per cent (n=283). At the other end of the 
scale, FPÖ supporters were the most likely to be in work — 70 
per cent (n=2,333) described themselves as employed.
CasaPound Italia experiences the lowest proportion of 
female support — only 13 per cent of online supporters were 
women (n=16,200). At the opposite end of the scale, both the 
Norwegian Progress Party (n=64,860) and the Danish People’s 
Party (n=15,640) registered 36 per cent female support.
Interestingly, gender imbalances appear to be more 
pronounced among online supporters when compared with 
other data on support for populist parties. According to the 
European Social Survey, females account for 36 per cent 
of Vlaams Belang voters (compared with 25 per cent in our 
sample); 37 per cent of True Finns voters (compared with 26 
per cent of our sample); and 43 per cent of Danish People’s 
Party voters (compared with 36 per cent of our sample).13
In respect of age, PPAM supporters are also younger: 
overall 63 per cent are under 30, compared with 51 per cent 
of Facebook users overall. The Sweden Democrats have the 
youngest online supporters: 63 per cent are below 21, which 
is particularly noteworthy given that Swedish Facebook 
users in general tend to be older than in the other countries 
surveyed — 54 per cent are over 30 (n= 4,032,420). In contrast, 
64 per cent of Norwegian Progress Party supporters are over 
30 (n=64,860), compared with a national figure of  
55 per cent (n= 2,250,240).
The older online support-base of the Norwegian 
Progress Party is perhaps unsurprising given that the party 
was founded in 1973 and holds an established position within 
mainstream Norwegian politics. However, Die Freiheit, which 
was established barely a year ago, also appears to attract 
older online supporters — 60 per cent are over 30 (n=4,280), 
compared with a national figure of 42 per cent (n=19,491,360). 
This indicates that the factors driving variations in the average 
age of online supporters go beyond the longevity and relative 
establishment of a given organisation.
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Table 3   extent of offline involvement of members of PPams in  
   countries investigated
Across all groups only a minority of Facebook fans 
considered themselves to be ‘formal’ members. While this 
varied from country to country, only among EDL supporters 
did expressions of ‘formal’ membership exceed 50 per cent. 
Particularly low levels of ‘formal’ membership were evident 
for PVV supporters (13 per cent), but this is likely to be 
because the PVV has no official party structure or norms of 
membership.16
As one might expect, a far higher proportion of online 
supporters actually voted for the party they supported 
Table 2   employment figures for members of PPams in countries  
   investigated
membership and involvement
The relationship between what people do online and their 
activity offline is one of the key questions of our research. 
We asked whether the respondents considered themselves 
‘formal members’ of the group in question; whether they voted 
for them at the last election (if the group in question was a 
political party); and whether they were involved in a political 
demonstration or march in the last six months (table 3).
National 
unemployment 
rate (%)
unemployed (%) employed (%) student (%) 
Bloc Identitaire 9.9 13 60 28
British National Party 8.1 22 32 46
CasaPound Italia 7.9 11 58 29
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
7.1 17 48 33
Die Freiheit 6.0 5 69 22
English Defence League 8.1 22 57 20
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
3.7 9 70 20
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
3.2 16 62 16
Front National 9.9 15 38 45
Lega Nord 7.9 14 38 46
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
4.5 11 66 22
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
7.8 19 54 24
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
7.2 11 42 45
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
6.8 11 61 26
average 7 14 54 30
Standard deviation 5 12 11
members of 
the party or 
group (%)
Voted for the 
party last 
election (%)
had taken part 
in a march or 
demo protest 
last 6 months (%)
National 
average taken 
part in public 
demo last 12 
months 15
Bloc Identitaire 32 47 18
British National Party 18 44 15 2
CasaPound Italia 20 43
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
24 48 19 8
Die Freiheit 29 20 8
English Defence League 76 55 2
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
39 83 15
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
38 80 14 10
Front National 19 65 25 18
Lega Nord 30 43 43
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
13 84 11 3
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
28 81 9 1
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
46 62 20 5
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
42 83 31 6
average 32 67 26 6
Standard deviation 16 17 15
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significant proportion takes to the streets. The figures also 
suggest that many supporters do not reject the political 
system entirely. They take politics seriously enough to vote, 
join political groups and attend demonstrations.
on Facebook. Five of the parties surveyed scored over 80 
per cent on this measure, while three scored under 50 per 
cent. One possible explanation for this is that support for 
some of these groups has increased since the last election. 
However, it could also be that this variation suggests that 
some populist parties are more successful than others in 
converting their online support into votes.
It could be that supporters of particular parties are 
more reluctant to take the ‘extra step’ between articulating 
virtual support and taking an action that could have a 
real-world consequence. It also suggests that parties such as 
the BNP (where only 44 per cent of supporters translated 
that support into votes) are presenting ideas that resonate 
with a wider group than their current electoral results would 
suggest. In other words, the parties with low scores on this 
measure have a significant pool of supporters who do not at 
present vote for the party, but who may do so in the future.
The final measure of offline activism considered was 
whether or not the respondent had taken part in a protest, 
march or demonstration in the past six months. Table 3 
includes results from the European Social Survey, in which 
respondents were asked a similar question, and provides 
some baseline of comparison.
Although there is considerable transnational variation, 
online members of PPAMs are shown to be more likely 
to demonstrate than the general public in all countries 
for which data is available — this suggests that Facebook 
membership acts as a bridge to offline activism, rather than 
a replacement for it. True Finn supporters are the least 
likely to take part in demonstrations, possibly reflecting the 
general reluctance of the Finnish public to take to the streets. 
At the opposite end of the scale, CasaPound Italia, Bloc 
Identitaire and the EDL scored highest on this measure. This 
is unsurprising given the street-based nature of these groups.
The results suggest that the relationship between 
social media membership and ‘real world’ support is varied. 
Overall, significant numbers of online supporters are also 
active offline: many are party members and voters and a 
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3  why do people join? 
  By Jack Benfield, Jeff Howard and  
Marley Morris
Our study examined what motivated people to support a 
populist political party and movement (PPAM). Respondents 
were asked in an open-response question why they supported 
the group. In total, 5,125 PPAM supporters responded to the 
question. We had all the responses translated into English, 
and devised nine broad categories into which the majority 
of responses could be placed. We have included some 
of the quotes from respondents below, with the original 
language quotation provided in the endnotes. The responses 
were weighted, and European averages produced based on 
a multi-data set average (see methodology in annex 1 for a 
full explanation).
existing literature
Although there have been no previous studies aimed at 
understanding why people join PPAM social media groups, 
there is an expansive body of research examining why people 
in general vote for populist parties in Western Europe.
Most explanations emphasise one of three different sets 
of grievances that motivate citizens: economic grievances, 
disillusionment grievances and immigration grievances.17
The economic explanation of populism contends that 
economic frustration is the prime motivator of populists. 
This view has two components: first, that most supporters of 
PPAMs are blue-collar workers (‘victims’ of globalisation and 
outsourcing); and second, that these workers are motivated to 
join by financial concerns. Both views are disputed, however. 
Evidence of high numbers of middle-class supporters for 
certain PPAMs has raised doubts about the socioeconomic 
homogeneity of populist supporters.18 Meanwhile, a study 
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studies concerning offline supporters. Below, we present  
the most common results according to category type, 
including a small number of illustrative responses. At the 
end of the chapter, we discuss how our findings relate to  
the existing literature.
Reasons for joining a PPam
group values
While it is not discussed specifically in the literature, one 
typical explanation for a person joining an organisation 
is because they have a broad identification with its values. 
Respondents classified in this category were those who 
cited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, beliefs, 
aspirations or ideas of a PPAM as reasons for joining it.
On average 38 per cent (sd=18) of respondents provided 
reasons that fell within this category. There was, however, 
very high variation across countries. The proportion of 
respondents citing such reasons ranged from 81 per cent of 
Norwegian Progress Party respondents (n=909) to 15 per cent 
of both English Defence League (EDL) (n=804) and British 
National Party (BNP) respondents (n=283). Females were 
more likely than males to refer to group values within their 
answers — an average of 46 per cent (sd=23) of women did 
so, compared with an average of 34 per cent (sd=17) of men. 
There was no clear correlation between the tendency to refer 
to group values and age.
identity
As noted above, recent studies have favoured identity-based 
theories in explaining support for PPAMs. Respondents 
were classified in the identity category when they referred 
to a love of their country, commitment to preservation of 
traditional national and cultural values, or representation of 
the interests of ‘real’ countrymen as reasons for supporting 
or joining the organisation.
An average of 17 per cent (sd=9) of respondents gave 
reasons that fell within the identity category. The proportion 
by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten found that populist parties have 
failed to mobilise those voters who are unhappy with their 
nation’s economy any better than the mainstream parties.19 
Another study has shown that cultural determinants are far 
more influential than economic determinants in establishing 
working class support for populist parties.20
The second set of grievances concerns voters’ 
disillusionment with prevailing political parties and 
institutions. One argument advanced by scholars is that this 
disenchantment has led citizens to vote for populist political 
parties or join street groups out of protest. According to this 
‘protest vote’ model, supporters of populist parties are not 
necessarily ideologically committed to the principles and 
policies of PPAMs, but support them to vent frustration.
The literature is conflicted on the importance of protest 
sentiment. While many studies report disillusionment 
among PPAM supporters,21 there is considerable national 
variation in the importance of such sentiment as a mobilising 
factor.22 Moreover, scholars have questioned the accuracy 
of characterising votes for populist parties as protest votes. 
Ideological and policy commitment have, for example, been 
shown to be crucial motivators for such groups as Vlaams 
Blok and the FPÖ.23
The final category of grievances concerns immigration.24 
Some studies have demonstrated that concern, worry or 
antipathy toward immigrants is the feature that unifies 
populist groups.25 For example, one detailed study 
demonstrated that immigration scepticism, rather than racism, 
is the galvanising force behind the BNP.26 Until recently, 
much of the academic literature on this point suggested that a 
large degree of concern relating to immigration was economic 
in nature — people were fearful about jobs or housing. 
However, more recent research suggests that immigration 
is seen as a threat to cultural identity. As highlighted by 
Matthew Goodwin’s recent report, Right Response, this is an 
increasingly favoured view.27
Our data set provides a unique opportunity to test how 
far the results from our online sample match the findings of 
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Interestingly, it was not only the indigenous population 
that responded in this manner:
Because despite the fact that I’m Brazilian I have felt accepted  
by CasaPound Italia... I am Italian, I even have an identity  
card and I love this country for which I would die. 
(Italy — CasaPound Italia) 30
anti-immigration
Recent studies have shown that concern over immigration 
is a key predictor of support for PPAMs. Respondents were 
classified as being in the anti-immigration category when they 
explicitly professed concern or anger about rising immigration 
and its effects.
An average of 17 per cent (sd=10) of respondents included 
immigration scepticism as a reason for joining a PPAM. 
The proportion of respondents expressing anti-immigration 
sentiment ranged from 36 per cent of Sweden Democrats 
respondents (n=568) to 1 per cent of CasaPound Italia 
respondents (n=424). Women were slightly less likely to cite 
anti-immigration reasons than men — on average 15 per cent 
(sd=10) of women respondents compared with 19 per cent 
(sd=13) of men did so. Interestingly, younger respondents were 
more likely to specify anti-immigration reasons — on average, 
20 per cent (sd=12) of 16–20-year-olds cited it, while just 10 per 
cent (sd=11) of those aged 51 or over did.
Fear of a bleak future in which immigrants will 
outnumber nationals was a common theme:
The foreigners are slowly suffocating our lovely country. They have 
all these children and raise them so badly that in three or four 
generations time there’ll be no decent behaviour or well behaved 
children at all. (Denmark — Dansk Folkeparti) 31
of those providing such reasons ranged from 31 per cent of 
EDL respondents (n=804) to 3 per cent of Norwegian Progress 
Party respondents (n=909). There was little variation between 
the propensity of men and women to cite identity reasons — a 
pan-European average of 18 per cent (sd=9) of men did so, 
compared with 15 per cent (sd=13) of women. There was no 
correlation between a respondent’s age and their likelihood of 
referring to identity.
Although it is often believed that members of PPAMs 
join because they dislike non-members of their ethnic group, 
the reality appears more nuanced, with many citing positive 
defence of liberal Western values, albeit often in juxtaposition 
to the threat of Islam:
Every countryman has their right to speak their thoughts!  
For hundreds of years the monarchy has stood for its people and 
their freedom! No way can a Muslim race bring their rules to our 
country! I believe the leader of EDL is a true Englishman doing 
something for the honour of England and its people! (UK — EDL)
Human rights... against Islamisation of Europe and intolerance 
by Turkish and Arabic immigrants towards Gays and Jews... 
Preservation of the cultural values of our European democracies. 
(Germany — Die Freiheit) 28
While large number of respondents identified immigrants 
as the salient threat to their national identity and culture, 
not all those responding within the identity category also 
included anti-immigration or anti-minority sentiments. Some 
respondents considered PPAMs to be positive promoters of 
traditional national values:
Because it respects identities and it believes in the preservation of 
the history and culture of popular traditions. (Italy — Lega Nord) 29
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Disillusionment
As noted above, disillusionment with mainstream 
institutions — the ‘protest vote’ — is posited as a factor in 
driving support for PPAMs. Respondents were placed into the 
disillusionment category when they expressed disenchantment 
with major political institutions, with the political elite or with 
the direction of their country.
An average of 13 per cent (sd=7) of respondents referred 
to disillusionment in their answers. The proportion ranged 
from 27 per cent of Die Freiheit respondents (n=427) to 1 per 
cent of Bloc Identitaire respondents (n=128). The difference 
between men and women was marginal — on average 12 per 
cent (sd=7) of male respondents and 15 per cent (sd=15) of 
female respondents cited such reasons. The tendency to cite 
disillusionment did not vary with age.
In their responses, some respondents referred to 
particular parties that they felt let down by:
The desperate lies of the MPs, the comfortable way in which they live 
whilst the French face a multitude of problems such as insecurity, 
mass immigration and the middle class, who always pay the price. 
(France — Front National) 35
One Italian respondent suggested how disillusionment 
with the political class manifested as support for Lega Nord:
I hate politicians; they are all disgusting, especially when they get to 
the armchair of power. Since they are all the same, I choose the ones 
that defend my homeland. (Italy — Lega Nord) 36
anti-islam
Increasingly, commentators discuss European populists’ 
growing hostility towards Islam and Muslims. Respondents 
were classified in the anti-Islam category when they criticised 
Islam, Muslims or Arabs. An average of 10 per cent (sd=11) 
of respondents made such criticisms. By far the highest 
proportion of anti-Islam responses were given by EDL 
The perceived criminality of immigrants also featured frequently:
I am sick of seeing my homeland being ripped apart and the crime 
rate and rapes going through the roof with this scum coming into my 
country and ripping it apart and no one is doing a thing to stop it. 
(UK — BNP)
A number of respondents lamented immigrants’ 
supposed abuse of the welfare system as well as criticising 
them for obtaining employment at the expense of nationals:
I would like to send them back to their homes, rather than having 
to maintain them and give them jobs... It would be better if they 
gave Italians a job first, for example to me, since I am unemployed. 
(Italy — Lega Nord) 32
Immigrants were also viewed by many as posing a threat 
to national or Western cultural values. One young French 
respondent wrote that he had joined the Front National 
because he was worred about:
The loss of French customs, traditions. There are so many foreigners 
and we are almost struck with shame to be white and love our 
country. (France — Front National) 33
Although many respondents expressed a desire for an 
outright ban on immigration or the removal of immigrants 
to their countries of origin, others stressed the need for 
integration and assimilation:
My ancestry is from Eastern Europe but my parents taught 
me that you go with the practice of the place you move to and 
respect the country and integrate. Suddenly other parties 
want something completely different. It doesn’t work in the 
long run. I want to live in Sweden, not a multicultural fiasco. 
(Sweden — Sverigedemokraterna) 34
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to speak of the PPAM in a positive light, instead of merely 
displaying a lack of faith in other organisations.
On average 9 per cent (sd=5) of respondents mentioned 
integrity in their answers. Nearly one-fifth (17 per cent) of 
responses from CasaPound Italia (n=424) were classified under 
integrity, the highest of any group, whereas only 2 per cent of 
EDL responses (n=909) were so classified. The figures did not 
differ significantly across gender — for men there was a pan-
European figure of 8 per cent (sd=6) while for women it was 11 
per cent (sd=10).
Of course, many responses fell under both the integrity 
and disillusionment categories and those who talked of the 
group’s integrity often contrasted this with the failure of others:
It’s the only honest party — whether you agree or not with what is 
said, they tell the truth, not just what you want to hear like other 
parties. (UK — British National Party)
Because True Finns are honestly for [the] Finnish cause, and 
don’t conform [to] other parties’ consensus policies. True Finns 
can discuss about hard issues, take sides and look for solutions. 
(Finland — Perussuomalaiset (‘True Finns’))
Some described the courageousness of their group with 
reference to the tediousness of mainstream politics:
CasaPound Italia is the only revolutionary answer to the 
political dullness of these days. It’s life in a land of dead people! 
(Italy — CasaPound Italia)
economics
Economic concerns are found by most contemporary 
researchers to account for a minority of support for PPAMs. 
Respondents were classified in the economics category when 
they concerned such matters as tax policy, unemployment, 
poverty, government bailouts, trade policy, globalisation and 
income redistribution.
respondents (41 per cent; n=804) while no CasaPound Italia 
respondents (n=424) included anti-Islam comments. Men 
were slightly more likely to provide anti-Islam responses — on 
average 11 per cent (sd=12) did so compared with 8 per cent 
(sd=10) of women. In contrast to anti-immigration responses, 
there was little variation with age.
Some responses attacked Muslims directly:
We have to do something about all these Muslims who are taking 
over our country... [I] would happily talk to you about the 
massive Muslim problem that our whole world is experiencing. 
(Denmark — Dansk Folkeparti) 37
Others held somewhat more nuanced views on 
Islam — for example criticising certain aspects of Islamic law or 
tradition, while denying racist sentiments:
I want to stop the Islamisation of Sweden... Prevent the oppression 
of Islamic women by banning the burqa in public places. 
(Sweden — Sverigedemokraterna) 38
Above all I have joined Die Freiheit because this party fights  
against the Islamic ideology and the linked Islamisation without 
being racist, meaning that they are not against Muslims,  
if they are not criminals and if they do integrate themselves.  
(Germany — Die Freiheit)
integrity
It is often thought that populists’ disillusionment with 
mainstream institutions is tied to a belief that their 
organisation is in comparison honourable and trustworthy. 
The integrity category covered those respondents who spoke 
admiringly of the honest, straight-talking and courageous 
approach of the group and those who believed they were 
consistent in their convictions. This category differed from 
the disillusionment category in that it required respondents 
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Economic concerns were often combined with opposition 
to immigration, with some respondents viewing immigrants as 
a drain on the state’s resources:
Frustration and desire for change for durability and stability in 
employment, finance; and especially put a halt on immigration and 
stop the social aid which badly affects the wallets of the French with 
centuries-old French origin. Put a stop to immigration, benefits, 
exaggerated payouts to the foreigners. And give me a job. Thank you 
very much. (France — Front National) 41
anti-eu
With many populist groups campaigning on anti-EU 
platforms, it is possible that hostility to the EU is a factor in 
explaining populist support. Respondents were classified in 
the anti-EU category when they criticised the EU and/or the 
decisions made by EU institutions.
Only 3 per cent (sd=4) of respondents on average gave 
their opposition to the EU as a motivation for joining PPAMs. 
Finnish respondents were most likely to express anti-EU 
sentiments, with 13 per cent doing so (n=692). However, 
anti-EU sentiment was expressed by less than 1 per cent of 
CasaPound Italia (n=424), Lega Nord (n=841), Vlaams Belang 
(n=464) and Norwegian Progress Party respondents (n=909). 
Women and men differed little in this category — an average of 
3 per cent of male respondents (sd=5) and 2 per cent of female 
respondents (sd=3) cited it in their responses. There was no 
clear correlation between age and anti-EU sentiment.
Concern about the loss of national sovereignty as a result 
of increased European integration was one of the key sentiments 
expressed by respondents falling within this category.
secessionism/federalism
Respondents were classified in the secessionism/federalism 
category when they stated that they supported a PPAM 
because of its commitment to secessionist or federalist 
objectives. An average of 3 per cent of respondents (sd=6) 
provided responses within this category. Such responses were 
An average of just 4 per cent (sd=2) of respondents 
mentioned economic motivations for joining a PPAM: 6 per 
cent of respondents across a third of PPAMs cited economics 
while less than 1 per cent of CasaPound Italia (n=424) and Bloc 
Identitaire (n=128) respondents did so. There were negligible 
differences between men and women — an average of 4 per 
cent (sd=2) of male respondents cited economic reasons for 
joining PPAMs, compared with 3 per cent (sd=3) of women. As 
might be expected, economic motivations were specified most 
frequently by 21–25-year-olds (although the pan-European 
average was still only 7 per cent (sd=7) for that age category).
Where economic concerns were given as a reason for 
joining a PPAM, they were diverse in content, with high 
taxation, personal indebtedness and the inability of the state to 
provide for working people all featured within the responses:
The rise in prices, the incapacity to pay our debts, despite my 
husband and me working. No perspective on the future as long as 
the state continues to take the little money we earn from us. The 
incapacity of the state to look after the honest people who work and 
despite all don’t have enough to eat and feed our children at the end 
of each month. (France — Front National) 39
There’s too much interference in people’s private lives. Everything 
has high taxes and people should be more free to choose and do their 
own thing. (Norway — Norwegian Progress Party)
Respondents also expressed their opposition to 
government cuts and their impact on families:
Where is the concern for our children, who are the people who  
have to carry our Danish society forward? I don’t understand how 
there can be so many cuts around children. We all want to live  
in a welfare state but no one thinks about how the people who have  
to carry the society forward are being dropped on the floor.  
(Denmark — Dansk Folkeparti) 40
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These results suggest that the vast majority of respondents 
support PPAMs because they identify with their policy 
offerings rather than because they desire to shock or protest.
This does not mean, of course, that online members 
are satisfied with mainstream organisations. A substantial 
proportion of respondents (a pan-European figure of 9 per 
cent) saw PPAMs as honest and straight-talking, a fresh 
alternative to the stale status quo. Many lauded PPAMs for 
speaking out about issues that mainstream organisations 
are unwilling or unable to address. These responses often 
emphasised PPAMs’ commitment to action, to working hard to 
accomplish change ‘on the ground’. This suggests that PPAMs 
are successfully portraying themselves as credible alternatives 
to political elites who have lost touch with the people they are 
supposed to represent.
Our findings also offer some illumination on 
immigration. An average of 17 per cent of responses 
was classified as anti-immigration, a significant but not 
overwhelming proportion. This suggests that a successful 
explanation of the support for PPAMs must invoke more than 
just negative attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, although 
some academic literature suggests that the economic threat of 
immigration is driving people into these groups, only a very 
low proportion of respondents mentioned economic grievances 
or preferences of any sort (an average of 4 per cent). Why 
younger respondents were more likely than older respondents 
to cite concerns about immigration as a reason for joining a 
PPAM is not something our data can fully answer, but this is 
certainly worthy of further investigation.
An alternative explanation of the underlying causes of 
hostility towards immigration is found in the pan-European 
average of 17 per cent of responses classified in the identity 
category — the joint second highest rated category alongside 
anti-immigration. The considerable number of respondents 
placed in this category suggests that a desire to protect national 
and cultural identity is a more important factor in explaining 
PPAM support than economic grievances, and is perhaps the 
principal driving force behind concerns about immigration.
provided almost exclusively by those from Vlaams Belang  
(18 per cent of total responses; n=464) and Lega Nord (17 
per cent of total responses; n=841) — parties that campaign 
respectively on platforms of Flemish independence and 
Northern Italian autonomy.
other
Some 10 per cent (sd=7) of responses on average 
included content that could not be classified within the 
aforementioned categories. Respondents who solely included 
content of this kind were classified in the category ‘other’. 
Some of the issues raised in these responses included safety, 
pensions and animal rights.
Discussion
It is clear from the range of results within each category 
that national context matters greatly. For example, given 
widespread corruption in Italy, it is not surprising that 17 
per cent of responses from the Italian street organisation 
CasaPound Italia fell under ‘integrity’, the highest of any 
group for this category. Nor is it surprising that the responses 
from the Norwegian Progress Party, as the second-largest party 
in Norway and part of the mainstream political establishment, 
featured so few responses in this category — only 4 per cent.
Our research suggests that online PPAM supporters 
cannot be accurately characterised as ‘protest voters’, who 
support PPAMs to shock and voice discontent with elites, 
rather than to advance ideological or policy aims. While many 
online PPAM sympathisers are disillusioned with the political 
status quo, they do not appear to be primarily motivated 
by a desire to protest. Although on average 13 per cent of 
respondents expressed disillusionment with mainstream 
political parties and organisations, an average of 38 per 
cent registered broad ideological agreement with the values, 
principles or aims of their respective organisation. In addition 
to this general alignment of values, numerous respondents 
identified specific PPAM policy goals as reasons for joining. 
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The desire to promote and protect national identity, 
however, did not merely contribute to immigration 
grievances. Concerns over identity were often articulated 
alongside opposition to Islam rather than immigration: some 
respondents expressed fear of Muslims, because of their 
perceived extremist views, in terms which suggested that their 
national origin was unimportant.42 In addition, a significant 
number of respondents spoke of upholding their countries’ 
values without expressing hostility to any minority group. 
While some of these responses seemed to be euphemistic 
attacks on minority groups, numerous responses emphasised 
the central importance of celebrating respondents’ own 
culture, rather than denigrating that of others. It seems that 
joining a PPAM provided a way for some people to reassert 
their intra-cultural ties and find a sense of belonging within 
their own communities.
Importantly, a concern with identity need not be 
understood solely in terms of traditional conservative values. 
While there are vague invocations of ‘French values’ or 
‘the British way of life’, in a number of groups many of the 
more specific responses referred to values such as freedom, 
democracy and human rights. This suggests that, for some, 
defending liberal values is an integral part of protecting 
one’s identity.
Overall, our results suggest that online respondents 
do not see themselves as primarily motivated by economic 
concerns; nor do they support PPAMs out of protest. Rather, a 
large proportion supports PPAMs because they are concerned 
about immigration; concerns which appear to be driven more 
by a desire to preserve and protect cultural identity than by 
any perceived economic threat.
The importance that supporters place on the protection 
of this identity also goes some way to explaining both their 
anti-Islamic sentiment and the desire to promote traditional 
values for their own sake.
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4  social and political views 
 
 
As part of the survey we asked respondents a number of 
questions regarding their social and political views, which 
were modelled where possible on Eurobarometer or European 
Values Survey questions to provide a baseline of comparison.
Top two biggest concerns
We asked PPAM supporters to rank their biggest social and 
political concerns, taken from a list of 18 current issues, 
including immigration, climate change, unemployment and 
out of touch politicians, among others.
Across our sample, over a third of PPAM supporters 
put immigration in the top two most important issues, 
followed by a quarter who cited Islamic extremism (table 4). 
Respondents also recorded concern about crime (17 per cent), 
the economic situation (16 per cent), rising prices (14 per cent), 
unemployment (13 per cent), multiculturalism (12 per cent) 
and ‘out of touch’ politicians (11 per cent). Comparing these 
responses to the Eurobarometer survey we find that populist 
parties and movement (PPAM) supporters are significantly 
more likely to cite immigration and crime. Direct comparisons 
with concerns over Islamic extremism are not possible as this 
is not included in the Eurobarometer survey. In contrast to 
PPAM supporters, the most pressing issues for respondents to 
the Eurobarometer survey are all economic in nature — with 
rising prices and inflation (46 per cent), the economic situation 
(20 per cent) and unemployment (19 per cent) being the top 
three concerns.
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Across the countries, however, there was significant 
variation in the priority given to certain issues. Concerns 
over immigration were highest in France, with 67 per cent 
of Bloc Identitaire respondents and 56 per cent of Front 
National respondents citing immigration as a top two 
concern. By contrast, concerns over Islamic extremism were 
highest among respondents from the Netherlands (48 per 
cent), Germany (40 per cent) and Belgium (39 per cent), and 
lowest among CasaPound Italia (6 per cent) and True Finn 
supporters (15 per cent).
Other parties revealed specific worries. German 
respondents were significantly more likely (32 per cent) to 
cite ‘out of touch politicians’ as a top two concern. The next 
closest were True Finn respondents (14 per cent) and BNP 
respondents (13 per cent). There was significant concern over 
unemployment among Italian respondents in particular, with 
24 per cent of CasaPound Italia supporters and 23 per cent of 
Lega Nord supporters citing it as a top two concern. On average, 
PPAM supporters are less likely to be concerned about the 
economic situation (16 per cent compared with 20 per cent for 
the Eurobarometer survey) and unemployment (13 per cent 
compared with 19 per cent for the Eurobarometer survey).
Politics and voting
In addition to specific social and political issues, we asked 
supporters about their general views on the efficacy of 
democratic politics, the future of their country and attitudes to 
violence in pursuit of political ends (table 5).
Table 4  Proportion of supporters of PPams and respondents  
   to eurobarometer survey who rated immigration,  
   islamic extremism and crime as one of their top  
   two concerns 43 
Rated immigration  
in top 2 (%)
Rated islamic 
extremism  
in top 2 (%)
Rated crime  
in top 2 (%)
PPam eurobarometer 
(country %)
PPam N/a PPam eurobarometer
(country %)
Bloc Identitaire 67 3 31 8 10
British National Party 45 6 21 8 8
CasaPound Italia 26 8 6 9 8
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
36 5 21 15 9
Die Freiheit 17 1 40 15 3
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
21 6 18 21 7
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
36 17 28
Front National 56 3 17 17 10
Lega Nord 25 8 16 9 8
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
28 3 48 25 5
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
33 4 15 9 4
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
48 6 32 24 7
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
38 8 39 26 14
Pan–european average 37 4 (EU average) 25 17 6 (EU average)
Standard deviation 14 12 8
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While support for voting was high, this was mixed with 
dissatisfaction with current politics: only 34 per cent agreed 
with the statement ‘politics is an effective way to respond to 
my concerns’. The most pessimistic were German Die Freiheit 
supporters (3 per cent) and Belgian Vlaams Belang supporters 
(10 per cent). The most optimistic, on the other hand, were 
supporters of the Norwegian Progress Party (70 per cent) and 
the Sweden Democrats (61 per cent).
We also asked respondents whether they agreed 
with the statement ‘violence is acceptable to ensure the 
right outcome’. It is important to stress that agreeing that 
violence is acceptable to ensure the right outcome does 
not necessarily imply that the group itself or its supporters 
are violent or are likely to engage in violence. It could, for 
example, also encompass agreement with British military 
action overseas — as in Libya, for which there was significant 
support across the country. While comparisons between the 
groups on this question are interesting, there is no baseline 
Europe-wide data on this question, making inferences about 
the relevance of this question difficult.
In France and Italy, supporters of street-based 
movements were more likely to agree that violence is 
acceptable to ensure the right outcome. Supporters of 
CasaPound Italia were the most likely of all the groups 
surveyed to agree with this statement (47 per cent), with 
Bloc Identitaire supporters a close second at 43 per cent. 
However, in the UK, there was little difference between 
EDL and BNP responses to this question. This may be 
because of the high number of BNP respondents who 
agreed violence is acceptable. In fact, among political 
parties, BNP supporters were most inclined to agree 
with this statement (37 per cent), followed by Lega Nord 
supporters (32 per cent) and Front National supporters  
(29 per cent). On average, one in four PPAM supporters 
agreed with the above statement.
Table 5  Proportion of supporters of PPams who agreed with  
   statements about voting, the effectiveness of politics  
   and whether violence is acceptable to achieve  
   the right outcome 
The majority of respondents did not agree with the 
statement ‘it does not matter who you vote for’, suggesting 
that those drawn to PPAMs are not completely disillusioned 
with democratic choices. On average, 16 per cent of PPAM 
supporters agreed with the above statement, expressing 
disillusionment with the act of voting.
agree that it does 
not matter who 
you vote for (%)
agree that politics 
is an effective way 
to respond to my 
concerns (%)
agree that violence 
is acceptable to 
achieve the right 
outcome (%)
Bloc Identitaire 19 20 43
British National Party 21 40 37
CasaPound Italia 16 43 47
Danish People’s Party 10 41 15
Die Freiheit 26 3 12
English Defence League 33 35 34
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
8 14 17
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
13 70 14
Front National 21 28 29
Lega Nord 9 45 32
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party)
13 29 25
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
6 55 21
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
9 61 14
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
12 10 23
average 16 35 26
Standard deviation 8 19 11
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In the latest Eurobarometer survey in spring 2011,  
26 per cent on average were optimistic that their life would be 
better in the next 12 months, 14 per cent thought it would be 
worse and 57 per cent thought it would stay the same. Using 
this as a baseline measure we found that, interestingly, PPAM 
supporters seemed to be more optimistic about their own 
personal lives than their compatriots in a number of countries, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Italy (CasaPound 
Italia supporters). The least optimistic respondents by a 
significant margin were French respondents — with only 10 
per cent of Bloc Identitaire and Front National respondents 
expressing optimism about their lives compared to a national 
average of 33 per cent.
That optimism, however, dropped significantly when 
it came to their views about the future of their respective 
countries as a whole. When asked if they agreed that their 
nation was ‘on the right track’ (see table 6), only an average 
of 10 per cent of supporters said they agreed. Danish People’s 
Party supporters were the most optimistic for their country with 
27 per cent agreeing with the statement. The least optimistic 
were Vlaams Belang supporters, which had only 3 per cent 
of respondents believing their nation was on the right track, 
followed by 4 per cent of Bloc Identitaire supporters.
Personal and national optimism
We also wanted to explore whether PPAM supporters were 
optimistic or pessimistic about their own future prospects, as 
well as the future of their country (table 6).
Table 6  Proportion of supporters of PPams and respondents  
   to eurobarometer survey who thought their country  
   was on the right track and that the next 12 months 
   would be better than the last for them personally
is [your country] on  
the right track? 44
will the next 12 months  
be better than the last for  
you personally? 45 
PPam agree  
(%) 
eurobarometer 
agree (%)
PPam agree 
(%)
eurobarometer 
agree (%)
Bloc Identitaire 4 17 10 33
British National Party 12 35 27 34
CasaPound Italia 8 17 30 23
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
27 44 46 34
English Defence League 5 41 21 21
Die Freiheit 8 35 23 34
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
11 47 21 19
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
12 31
Front National 4 17 10 33
Lega Nord 11 17 21 23
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
19 35 26 32
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
16 49 27 32
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
14 56 38 49
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
3 26 53 33
average 10 28 (EU average) 27 26 (EU average)
Standard deviation 7 12
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Comparing these responses with those of the 
Eurobarometer survey we find that PPAM supporters are 
significantly more likely than the general population in their 
respective countries to have negative feelings towards the 
European Union. When asked what the European Union 
meant to respondents, the top three answers from the 
Eurobarometer survey were ‘freedom to travel, work and study’ 
at 45 per cent, the euro currency at 38 per cent and ‘waste of 
money’ at 24 per cent. Compared with the answers above, only 
21 per cent cited ‘bureaucracy’, 18 per cent cited ‘not enough 
control over external borders’, 13 per cent cited ‘more crime’ 
and only 11 per cent cited ‘loss of cultural identity’.
It is clear, therefore, that despite some significant 
variation among the different countries and group supporters, 
on the whole PPAM supporters are significantly more 
concerned about immigration, Islamic extremism, crime and 
cultural erosion than the Eurobarometer survey responses 
suggest is common of the average European.
Table 7  Proportion of PPam supporters and eurobarometer  
   respondents who thought the eu was a waste of 
   money, did not exert enough control over external 
   borders and had led to a loss of cultural identity 46
Particularly given the current political climate, it is perhaps 
no surprise that PPAM supporters were likely to be negative 
towards the EU (table 7). When asked to select what the EU 
meant to them personally, the most common response was ‘waste 
of money’ (59 per cent), followed by ‘not enough control over 
external borders’ (58 per cent), ‘loss of our cultural identity’ (56 
per cent), ‘more crime’ (46 per cent) and ‘bureaucracy’ (36 per cent).
mentioned waste of  
money (%)
mentioned not 
enough control over 
external borders (%)
mentioned loss of 
cultural identity (%)
PPam euro-
barometer
(country %)
PPam euro-
barometer
(country %)
PPam euro-
barometer
(country %)
Bloc Identitaire 46 31 70 24 58 11
British National Party 64 28 60 22 64 19
CasaPound Italia 48 12 46 14 63 11
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
55 17 53 37 48 14
Die Freiheit 80 43 70 24 69 9
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
84 48 77 40 72 22
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
48 47 38
Front National 52 31 55 24 55 11
Lega Nord 32 12 33 14 29 11
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
68 21 56 21 52 12
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
74 27 62 13 69 8
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
63 34 58 17 57 9
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
57 27 69 22 58 7
average 59 24 (EU avg.) 58 18 (EU avg.) 56 11 (EU avg.)
Standard deviation 15 12 12
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5   Trust in institutions 
 
 
Our survey also asked about levels of generalised and 
institutional trust. Participants were asked to rate their level 
of agreement with a statement suggesting that ‘in general, 
people cannot be trusted’, as well as indicating whether, in 
general, they were inclined to ‘trust’ or ‘distrust’ a range of 
civic institutions.
generalised trust
Generalised trust has long been accepted by academics as 
an essential component of ‘social capital’ 47 — a concept that 
refers to the ability of an individual or group to participate 
in society successfully, mostly as a result of involvement in 
social networks.48 Academics like Robert Putnam suggest 
that an individual’s ability to trust those unlike themselves 
is core to the establishment of ‘norms of reciprocity’ within 
wider society, without which individual civic engagement 
is impossible.49 Consequently, those with low levels of 
generalised trust tend to remain on the fringes of society.
The results of the analysis of the generalised trust 
question are presented in table 8, and compared against the 
most recent wave of the European Values Survey, which  
asks a similar question.
71Trust in institutions
All groups except one (the Norwegian Progress Party) 
evidenced low levels of generalised trust, with a majority of 
research participants agreeing with the question either a little or 
entirely. When compared against a baseline measure, the most 
recent wave of the European Values Survey, populist parties and 
movement (PPAM) supporters exhibited slightly lower levels of 
generalised trust than the general population in their country 
but in most cases the difference was marginal. Exceptions can be 
seen in the Scandinavian countries. In general, Scandinavians 
displayed higher levels of generalised trust — for example, 74 per 
cent in Norway, 68 per cent in Sweden and 58 per cent in Finland 
compared with 30 per cent in the UK, 30 per cent in Italy and only 
18 per cent in France. Interestingly, in three cases (Lega Nord, 
British National Party and Front National) PPAM supporters 
actually reported higher levels of generalised trust than the 
national average — though again the difference was by a relatively 
small number of percentage points.
While it is interesting that PPAM supporters report 
mostly lower levels of generalised trust, it is not overly 
significant. The slightly lower levels of trust evidenced by 
PPAM supporters may result from their disproportionate 
experience of unemployment — as some academics have 
argued that economic marginalisation may reduce social 
capital, civic engagement and generalised trust.51
institutional trust
In addition, we asked respondents a range of questions about 
how far they trusted various institutions (table 9).
 
Table 8  whether PPam supporters and respondents to the  
   european Values survey agree that other people,  
   in general, can be trusted
PPam agree (%) european Values survey 50 
agree (%)
Bloc Identitaire 14 19
British National Party 32 31
CasaPound Italia 26 31
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
38
Die Freiheit 35 37
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
21
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
54 74
Front National 27 19
Lega Nord 31 31
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
30
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
41 59
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
32 68
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
24
average 33 41
Standard Deviation 10
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Similarly, data on trust in overtly political institutions 
(European Union, the government) shows there is a significant 
gap between group members and their national compatriots. 
Overall levels of trust in the EU and government were low for 
group members, with robust majorities in all groups reporting a 
tendency to distrust (table 10).
Table 10  whether PPam supporters and respondents to the  
   european Values survey trust the government and  
   the european union 
Table 9  whether PPam supporters and respondents to the 
   european Values survey trust the police, the army  
   and the judiciary
The figures on confidence in the police and armed forces 
are broadly in line with the available data on national confidence 
levels taken from the European Values Survey, although slightly 
lower. However, the figures on trust in the judiciary differ 
significantly, with PPAM supporters significantly less likely 
to trust them than the general population in their respective 
countries: 30 per cent versus 60 per cent, with some notable 
variations, such as CasaPound Italia, which is even more 
pronounced.
Trust the police 52 Trust the army Trust the judiciary
PPam european 
Values 
survey 
(country %)
PPam european 
Values 
survey 
(country %)
PPam european 
Values 
survey 
(country %)
Bloc Identitaire 65 71 84 68 21 40
British National Party 46 72 83 79 23 60
CasaPound Italia 49 78 73 68 11 52
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
75 67 48
Die Freiheit 76 74 63 50 37 58
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
64 54 33
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
66 87 70 65 49 86
Front National 59 71 80 68 24 40
Lega Nord 63 78 62 68 30 52
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
48 70 38
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
80 92 79 88 40 82
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
61 78 69 47 28 74
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
48 58 14
average 62 78  
(European avg.)
65 67  
(European avg.)
30 60  
(European avg.)
Standard deviation 11 17 12
Trust government 53 Trust the european union
PPam  european Values 
survey (%)
PPam european Values 
survey (%)
Bloc Identitaire 11 28 9 39
British National Party 5 32 11 24
CasaPound Italia 11 24 15 42
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
46 53 18 52
Die Freiheit 8 40 5 35
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
5 62 4 45
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
14 17
Front National 17 28 12 39
Lega Nord 24 24 43 42
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
36 57 13 50
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
19 62 3 53
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
19 65 13 46
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
44 39 15 61
average 20 43  
(European avg.)
14 44  
(European avg.)
Standard deviation 14 10
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There was significant variation between the groups in 
the strength of distrust they showed toward the mainstream 
media. Results showing levels of trust in trade unions were 
less clear — while a majority of groups reported high levels of 
distrust, results from groups in the Danish People’s Party and 
the True Finns presented an opposing picture (table 11).
Table 11  whether PPam supporters and respondents to  
   the european Values survey trust trade unions and  
   the mainstream media 
Trust trade unions 54 Trust mainstream media
PPam eurobarometer 
(country %)
PPam eurobarometer 
(country %)
Bloc Identitaire 14 39 8 39
British National Party 30 30 6 14
CasaPound Italia 7 34 6 25
Dansk Folkeparti  
(‘Danish People’s Party’)
51 12
Die Freiheit 16 32 4 29
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs  
(FPO; ‘Austrian Freedom Party’)
31 11
Fremskrittspartiet 
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’)
36 66 17 36
Front National 20 39 10 39
Lega Nord 28 34 18 25
Partij voor de Vrijheid
(PVV or ‘Dutch Freedom Party) 
37 31
Perussuomalaiset  
(‘True Finns’)
53 63 10 33
Sverigedemokraterna
(‘Sweden Democrats’)
30 52 7 33
Vlaams Belang  
(‘Flemish Interest’)
27 15
average 29 43 (EU avg.) 12 30 (EU avg.)
Standard deviation 13 7
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6  what is the relationship 
between online and 
offline activism? 
 
By collecting large amounts of data and asking questions 
about offline activity, we can better understand the 
relationship between virtual and real-life involvement. To do 
this, we ran logistic regressions to analyse the impact of a 
range of attitudinal and demographic factors on supporters’ 
involvement with the party or movement in question.
Regressions were run against three separate dependent 
variables, all of which related to offline activity. These were: 
first, whether a supporter voted for the party in question 
(where applicable); second, whether the supporter considered 
themselves a formal member of the group; and finally, whether 
the supporter had been involved in a street demonstration or 
march in the previous six months.
Logistic regression allowed us to hold certain 
demographic characteristics constant (age, gender, 
employment, educational levels, city) while showing whether 
other attitudinal measures affected the likelihood that a 
supporter would be involved in offline activity. Regressions 
were run iteratively against all the attitudinal measures (full 
regression results are available at www.demos.co.uk). Below, 
we present only those that had achieved a significant change 
in the odds ratio, combined with some degree of statistical 
significance. The results presented here are based on the 
entire sample (n=8,889) and may mask interesting variations 
across countries.55 These will be examined more closely in 
forthcoming papers.
It is important to stress that such an approach cannot 
let us reliably infer causation about what drives people to 
shift from online to offline involvement, but it does indicate 
significant correlations that may be a fruitful starting point  
for future research.
79What is the relationship between online...
than those who did not (p=0.001). Interestingly, people who 
agreed with the statement that the national government 
cannot be trusted were also slightly more likely to vote for 
the party than those who did not.59 These results suggest 
that a lack of faith in current institutions is important 
in predicting a shift from online to offline involvement, 
especially if mixed with concerns about immigration.
members versus non-members
Voting for a political party is in some senses a relatively 
passive form of political involvement. A stronger indicator of 
party or group engagement is whether the person considers 
themselves to be a formal member of the party or group 
in question. Nearly one-third (32 per cent) of Facebook 
supporters considered themselves to be formal members of 
the party in question.
When attitudinal variables are controlled, men and 
women are equally likely to be members of PPAMs, in contrast 
with their likelihood of voting as discussed above. However, 
similar to voting, being employed is correlated with more 
active involvement in a PPAM: being employed is associated 
with a 31 per cent increase in the likelihood of being a formal 
member of a PPAM.60
Interestingly, the motivations that appear to drive people 
to join a PPAM formally are not quite the same as those that 
encourage them to vote. Above all, formal members appear 
to have more confidence in politics, and are more likely to 
disavow violence. Supporters who agree with the statement 
‘politics is an effective way to respond to my concerns’ are 42 
per cent more likely to be formal members than supporters who 
don’t.61 Supporters who disagree with the statement ‘violence 
is acceptable to ensure the right outcome’ are 18 per cent more 
likely to be members than supporters who agree with it.62
It appears that multiculturalism is a particularly 
important concern for participants. People who list 
‘multiculturalism’ as one of their top three concerns are 32 per 
cent more likely to be members than people who don’t.63
Voters versus non-voters
Across the data set of political parties, 67 per cent of online 
supporters reported to have voted for the populist political 
party at the most recent national election. As noted in chapter 4, 
this could be because support for these parties has increased 
since the previous election. However, it also suggests that a 
significant number of Facebook fans of political groups — one 
in three — are generally interested or supportive — but not to 
the extent of actually voting for the party.
We asked supporters of the political parties if they had 
voted for the party they supported on Facebook in the last 
general election; and compared their replies against those of 
the Facebook supporters who had not.
The regressions revealed some interesting attitudinal 
differences between those who were voters and those who were 
not, which illustrates what sort of issues are most likely to drive 
people to the polls.
When controlling for attitudinal and demographic 
factors, being female increased the likelihood that a 
respondent would vote for the party by 52 per cent (p=.001). 
Similarly, being employed increased the likelihood that a 
respondent would be a voter by 93 per cent (p=.001).
The attitudinal factors that supporters listed as concerns 
appeared to make a major difference to their likelihood of 
voting. Most important of all was immigration. Supporters 
who listed immigration as one of their top three concerns were 
109 per cent more likely to vote for the party than supporters 
who did not;56 supporters who listed Islamic extremism as 
one of their top three concerns were 85 per cent more likely 
to vote for the party than supporters who did not;57 while 
supporters who listed crime as well as supporters who listed 
multiculturalism were both 54 per cent more likely to vote for 
the party than supporters who did not.58
Other attitudinal measures related to trust in 
democracy and political institutions also demonstrated 
significant change. As might be expected, those who 
disagreed with the statement ‘it does not matter who you 
vote for’ were 89 per cent more likely to vote for the party 
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concerned about corruption were 31 per cent more likely 
to demonstrate when street-based movements were not 
included.69 It also appears that general trust levels are a strong 
indicator of intention to demonstrate: supporters who disagree 
with the statement ‘in general people cannot be trusted’ are  
30 per cent more likely to demonstrate than people who 
don’t.70 This figure is 34 per cent when street-based movements 
are removed.71
Demonstrators versus non-demonstrators
Perhaps the strongest indicator of offline involvement is 
whether an individual has been involved in a march or 
demonstration in the previous six months. As might be 
expected, across the total data set this number is lower 
than the number of voters and members. Only 26 per cent 
of supporters have taken part in this sort of activity, and a 
significant amount of this activity takes the form of street-
based movements.
Perhaps unsurprisingly — and in contrast to the 
voters — men are more likely to be demonstrators than 
women — being male increased the likelihood that a supporter 
will demonstrate by 16 per cent. When we removed street-
based movements from the regression, the effect was lost. 
Employment, however, was not positively correlated with 
active engagement in demonstrations, as is the case with voting 
and being a formal party member. Our regression revealed 
that unemployed respondents were 14 per cent more likely to 
demonstrate than employed participants, although this did not 
attain statistical significance.64
Interestingly, demonstrators are more likely to believe 
in politics as a channel to respond to concerns than non-
demonstrators. Those who agree with the statement ‘politics 
is an effective way to respond to my concerns’ are 23 per 
cent more likely to demonstrate than those who disagree.65 
Without the street-based movements this figure is 21 per cent.66 
However, agreeing with the statement ‘violence is acceptable 
to achieve the right outcome’ increased the likelihood that 
someone would demonstrate by 37 per cent. When we removed 
street-based movements from the regression, agreeing with 
the statement increased the likelihood of a respondent 
demonstrating by 26 per cent.67
It appears that slightly different concerns are important 
in convincing people to demonstrate than to vote. Supporters 
who listed corruption as one of their top three concerns were 
38 per cent more likely to demonstrate than those who did 
not, while immigration, Islamic extremism, multiculturalism 
and crime were not considered very important.68 Supporters 
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methodology
Our research represents a first attempt to collect quantitative 
data on populist parties and movements (PPAMs) at an 
international level, and is the first large-scale and empirically 
rigorous quantitative study ever undertaken on online 
supporters of these groups and parties.
Data collection
To collect the data, we selected groups which:
· were either political or street-based protest movements that  
could legitimately be described as populist (based on a review  
of academic literature)
· were based in Western Europe
· had a sizeable Facebook presence (at least 2,000 fans for either 
the party’s official Facebook fan page and/or the leader).
Before starting the survey the research team discussed 
the literature on factors predisposing involvement in 
nationalist-populism groups and produced a shortlist of 
possible questions capable of measuring these factors.
After further discussion, we produced a final survey 
of 20 questions, including items measuring participants’ 
demographic profiles, social and family backgrounds, level 
of confidence in public institutions, group involvement and 
national policy concerns. For each country, we translated 
the questionnaire into the required language and — where 
appropriate — adapted measurements to the specific country 
context (as for the questions on educational attainment).
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Where possible, we used measurement scales 
employed by the 2010/11 Eurobarometer poll or European 
Values Study to allow for a direct comparison with national 
level data.
We ran a Facebook advert targeted at fans of all parties 
and/or party leader’s Facebook pages over the summer of 
2011. Each advert invited Facebook fans of the group in 
question to click on a link which redirected them to our 
online survey. As table 12 shows, our campaign ran over a 
three-month period, with no single advert being available 
for more than six weeks. On clicking the advert, participants 
were redirected to a digital survey page, which set out the 
details and purpose of the survey along with an invitation 
to take part. The size of target population varied from 
country to country, depending on the size of the Facebook 
membership of the group in question.
 
Table 12  Data collected for survey on PPams
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We address each issue in turn below.
Reliability
It is possible that participants may have given ‘sanitised’ 
responses in our survey in order to present a more favourable 
public image of the group. However, the level of consistency 
across participant responses, alongside answers which may 
be considered detrimental to the group’s image, suggests that 
this did not occur to a significant degree. We also guaranteed 
the anonymity of all participants, thus removing incentives to 
provide inaccurate feedback. Finally, we intentionally limited 
the time the advert ran in order to reduce the chance of a 
concerted campaign on the part of respondents.
Trolling
Because participation in the survey was, in some respects, 
‘public’ (available to anyone who clicked the link — although 
it was only viewed by the target population), there was a 
risk that people who were members of the Facebook group 
but not genuine supporters might complete the survey. 
A related risk arose from the ‘trolls’ (individuals who are 
expressly opposed to the group in question, and join in 
order to cause discord) filling in the survey with excessively 
negative responses to prejudice our results. It is well known 
that Facebook groups often contain these ‘trolls’, especially 
groups of a controversial nature.
On analysis of the survey returns, some responses were 
found to be from individuals who stated openly they were 
not part of the group, but did not appear to be intentionally 
trying to corrupt the results. These were removed from the 
sample. In addition, there was a small number of responses 
that were clearly from individuals who strongly disliked the 
group in question, evidenced primarily by their response 
to the open text questions, or by responding to every 
single question with the highest positive scores. These were 
removed. In one instance, we were alerted to a concerted 
campaign by an anti-EDL group on Facebook whose 
members were filling the surveys in with the express intention 
These cross country variations require clarification. 
The ‘unique impressions’ column lists the number of unique 
occasions the advert was displayed on the target audience’s 
Facebook sidebar. The variation in these figures is a result 
of both the target population size and the number of 
adverts from other companies that may have been running 
simultaneously. The click per impressions ratio was relatively 
stable, at around 1 per cent. There are some outliers, such 
as the EDL, which may be explained by a specific ‘trolling’ 
campaign (see below).
The click to survey completion ratio also stabilised 
at between 40 per cent and 50 per cent. This non-response 
rate may be the result of some respondents deciding not to 
take part in the survey on reading the consent form. Our 
method to correct for non-response rates is discussed below. 
The size of the final data was lower than the number of 
surveys completed because we removed troll responses and 
incomplete surveys.
Data analysis and limitations
We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is 
a popular mode of communication for supporters of many 
of the groups and parties we surveyed. However, the use 
of a sample recruited through a social media site leads to 
a number of significant (and sometimes entirely novel) 
difficulties, most notably:
· problems relating to the reliability of online data, principally 
regarding whether respondents answered accurately and 
truthfully
· problems relating to ‘trolls’ or bogus individuals who 
completed the survey intentionally to corrupt the results
· how well our online sample represents the total online 
population of each Facebook group
· how well the sample represents the members of the group or 
party that are not on Facebook.
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offline validity
While the use of a post-stratification weight is an improvement 
on the use of unweighted data, it cannot be automatically 
claimed as a reliable basis for making inferences about the 
offline group.79 The use of social network surveys is subject 
to a well-known technical and methodological critique 
focusing on the nature of self-entry interest classification on 
Facebook, the lack of content reliability on social networking 
sites, and the lack of internet access and usage in the broader 
population, all of which are capable of irreparably biasing the 
results of the survey.
Therefore, we take care not to claim, at any point in the 
text, that our sample represents or reflects the official views of 
the group, or indeed of its offline membership.
Presentation of the data
Unless otherwise stated, the results provided are the result 
of analysis undertaken using the weighted data. Throughout, 
we present pan-European averages, which are based on the 
average of results from each country. This is intended to give 
a very broad overview of the European level picture. These 
results are constructed by taking the percentage scores of each 
of the countries' weighted data percentages and creating an 
aggregate average. This is acceptable practice when dealing 
with multi-level data sets, and protects against the danger that 
national averages are skewed by particularly large individual 
country data sets as would be the case if the European 
averages were based on a single analysis of the entire data set.
However, these European level averages mask very 
important variations across countries and groups. Therefore, 
alongside all pan-European averages, we also present the 
standard deviation, which shows the extent to which individual 
country or group results deviate from the norm. We also 
provide examples of those variations where they are sizeable.
Each chapter applies slightly different methodologies, 
and we discuss each in turn.
of destroying the results. Once we collected the data we 
identified a number of responses which we believed to be 
from these individuals, mainly as they had explicitly stated in 
their answers to the open-response questions that they were 
anti-EDL. These were easy to identify and we removed them.
In total, we removed just over (13 per cent, n=1,655) of all 
responses for these reasons.
online validity
In order to increase the predictive validity of our results, we 
decided to apply a post-stratification weight, using the known 
demographics of the online population to correct the sample’s 
balance of gender and age in line with the makeup of the 
group as a whole. To do this, we gathered background data on 
the composition of each surveyed group’s membership using 
Facebook’s advertising tool (which is freely available for any 
user to access).77 We gave each participant a weighted value 
on the basis of the prevalence of their demographic profile 
(age and gender) in the population at large. This follows 
the procedure for making statistical inferences from non-
random web data outlined by Jelke Bethlehem.78 This allowed 
for greater confidence that our results were more broadly 
representative of our Facebook population.
Although we achieved demographic 
representativeness — which can correct for systematic age 
or gender-related bias — it is possible there exist certain 
attitudinal self-selection biases, because this was a self-select 
survey. For example, it might be the case that the more 
frustrated or active supporters were more likely to respond. 
The risk of attitudinal bias in self-selection panels is well 
established, although the extent to which this takes place 
in Facebook recruitment surveys is not known given the 
newness of this methodology, and the resulting lack of 
comparable datasets with which to draw firm conclusions. 
It is with caveat that the results are presented.
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ethical considerations
As this research focused on adolescents over the age of 16, no 
Criminal Records Bureau check was necessary; consequently, 
none was sought. Similarly, it was not necessary for us 
to obtain informed consent from participant parents or 
guardians as Social Research Association ethics guidelines 
suggest such clearance should not be sought and is not 
required when investigating participants aged over 16.  
We sought and gained individual informed consent from all 
participants, who agreed to a consent statement presented 
at the start of the survey — failure to sign acceptance of this 
statement prevented them from participating further in the 
research. Although we targeted the survey only at people  
aged over 16, a small number of individuals stated they were 
under 16 when responding to the question about age.  
We immediately deleted data relating to these people.
We stated on the Facebook advert that we were 
representing Demos, and were undertaking a survey of 
Facebook members of the group in question. On clicking, 
the participant was redirected to the survey landing page. 
On that page we pointed out that leaders of each group had 
been informed about the survey. Before running the survey, 
Demos emailed each of the groups in question to let them 
know about the survey. On the landing page we also stated 
that we would be letting the party in question know about 
the results before they were made public. Before release, we 
emailed the parties and groups in question with the results 
where it pertained to their members.
We did not brief participants fully on the study’s 
aims before completing the survey in order to avoid the 
exhibition of demand characteristics. We provided only a 
broad overview of the research at the start of the survey, 
and gave more detailed information on the project’s aims 
only after the last question had been completed.  
We provided the contact details of the lead researcher  
to all participants to cover the eventuality that they 
had questions not covered by the debrief notes, but few 
participants made use of it.
In chapter 2, the gender and age of each of the groups 
in question were collected directly from the publicly available 
Facebook group level data using the advertising tool 
mentioned above. This provides the most accurate results on 
the Facebook membership for each group. Results related 
to education, employment and involvement in the group are 
based on our weighted results.
Chapter 3 is based on the analysis of an open text 
question about why individuals joined the group in question. 
This open question allowed respondents to answer as they 
wished. A team of translators then coded the responses. 
We reviewed the content of the responses and created nine 
categories that were able to capture the content of most of the 
responses, together with a category ‘other’. Responses could 
fall into multiple categories. We removed data relating to 
respondents who were non-supporters of a PPAM, as we did 
with the rest of the survey results.80
In chapter 4 and 5 we give weighted results. In both 
of these chapters we provide comparative data where it is 
available from either the 2010/11 Eurobarometer survey or 
the European and World Values Survey. Where the questions 
are not worded identically, or there were additional answer 
options, this is expressly identified.
Finally, in chapter 6, we ran three sets of logistic 
regressions in order to understand the difference between 
offline and online activism. For the regressions, we recoded 
data following a process of iterative dichotomisations in order 
to produce a model of best fit. Dependent variables included 
whether or not respondents:
· voted for the party they were a fan of
· had protested or marched in the previous six months
· defined themselves as party members.
We ran regressions using demographic variables as 
controls (age, gender, education level and employment 
status). Independent variables included the whole suite of 
political and attitudinal responses.
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We told participants that they could withdraw from 
the research at any time before completion as part of a 
preface presented alongside the consent statement. Later we 
reminded them of this right when they completed the survey 
via a paragraph in the debrief notes, offering the possibility 
of immediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants 
opted to withdraw in this way.
We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant to 
the storage and handling of data; all data were kept digitally 
encoded in an anonymous format, and we didn’t store any 
data capable of identifying any participants.
We prepared for the eventuality that the research 
uncovered information with serious security implications, 
particularly relating to participant support for violence; 
we took precautions to absolve the researcher of moral 
responsibility towards the disclosure of information to 
agents of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the 
survey did not ask for precise details of acts of violence or 
illegal political protest. In order to preserve participant 
confidentiality (the deliberate exclusion by data capture 
systems of IP addresses) we removed from the researcher the 
means to identify and incriminate individual participants.
95
Annex 2  
european populist  
groups surveyed
Bloc identitaire (‘identity Block’), France
Bloc Identitaire is a street movement founded in 2003 and 
led by Fabrice Roberts, former member of the dissolved 
Unité Radicale party.81 It is associated with a number of other 
French regionalist movements including Alsace d’Abord, Nissa 
Rebela and La Ligue du Midi. Together they call themselves 
the ‘Identity Movement’.82 Roberts plans to build up a local 
network of elected officials to wield political power, modelling 
the party on Italy’s Lega Nord.83 In 2009, Bloc Identitaire 
became a formal political party claiming to be ‘left’ of the 
Front National.84
The group calls itself ‘identitarian’, as opposed to 
nationalist, because it defends regional and European 
identity as well as national identity. It opposes consumerism 
and globalisation, claiming the latter causes social 
injustice.85 One of the campaign's major initiatives was 
the launch of a brand of soupe au cochon (pork soup) at a 
Parisian soup kitchen, aimed at excluding Muslims.86  
The symbol of Bloc Identitaire is a black wild boar, chosen  
in part as a gibe at Muslims.87
The movement campaigns against the Islamisation 
of Europe, illegal immigration and ‘anti-white’ racism.88 
It aims to appeal to young people to get involved in their 
campaigns.89 One of the campaigns was ‘a soup for ours 
before others’.90 One of the campaign's major initiatives was 
the launch of a brand of soupe au cochon (pork soup) at a 
Parisian soup kitchen, aimed at excluding Muslims. In 2007 
a judge overturned a ban on the group’s activities in Paris, 
saying that there was no evidence to suggest that the group 
refused to serve Jews and Muslims, and so the group did not 
discriminate against them.91
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fascism and supporter of his resident Italy during the Second 
World War. It began in 2003 with the occupation of a 
state-owned building in Rome by student right-wingers. 
The occupation of buildings and public spaces became central 
to the rise of CasaPound Italia in Rome, where its ties remain 
strongest, and throughout Italy, especially northern Italy. 
CasaPound Italia’s occupied spaces have been, and continue 
to be, sites of communal engagement — political discussion, 
sports and musical performance, prominently centred around 
the band ZetaZeroAlfa, which features CasaPound Italia’s 
leader, Gianluca Iannone.
Their policy positions and rhetoric are grounded in 
economic populism and scepticism of free markets when they 
do not work in the best interest of Italian workers. Invoking 
a complex roster of characters as diverse as JRR Tolkien and 
Che Guevera to justify its policy aims, CasaPound Italia 
infuses market-sceptical economic populism with rebellious 
anti-statist contrarianism, all alongside traditional family 
values. The seemingly paradoxical ideology hangs together 
through a nationalist focus on the problems of ‘real’ Italians. 
It is fitting that CasaPound Italia began as a squatters’ 
movement, as one of its foremost concerns is housing policy; 
the organisation once proposed a bill that would afford 
a right to own property to all white Italians. One of the 
policy proposals that has gained the most traction would 
allow citizens to purchase property at cost (no one makes a 
profit) from the state; this ‘social mortgage’ programme has 
attracted widespread support from the current government. 
Other CasaPound Italia policy objectives include combating 
rising consumer prices, and reducing the number of mothers 
who have to work.
CasaPound Italia’s way of doing politics remains 
grounded in the street, and therefore exhibits a deeply 
avant-garde character despite serious political organisation 
and influence throughout northern Italy. Squatting and 
building occupations have been supplemented by rallies, 
demonstrations and a regular radio broadcast. Supporters 
have hung mannequins to represent Italians strangled 
British National Party, uK
John Tyndall, a former founder of the National Front, founded 
the BNP in 1982.92 Tyndall was a highly controversial figure 
in British politics, largely because of his former role as deputy 
leader of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement.93 The 
party’s most notable electoral successes came in 2006, when 
it won 12 out of the 13 seats it contested on the Barking 
and Dagenham local council, and in 2009, when two BNP 
politicians — including Nick Griffin, the current party 
leader — were elected to the European Parliament.94 In 2010, it 
lost all 12 seats on the council.95 In the same year, it changed 
its policy of only allowing white people to be members.96
The BNP’s trademark issue is its staunch anti-
immigration position.97 While the party is not overtly anti-
Islam, in 2009 Griffin said, ‘Islam and our society don’t mix.’98 
The BNP seeks to end all immigration to the UK, to deport 
all illegal immigrants, to deport all foreign-born criminals, 
to reject all asylum seekers who passed safe countries en 
route to Britain, and to offer resettlement grants to foreigners 
who are here legally.99 The BNP claims to want Britain to 
‘remain — or return to — the way it has traditionally been’, 
citing the belief that in less than 60 years, white Britons will be 
a minority in the UK.100
Griffin has also courted controversy through various 
appearances on current affairs programmes such as BBC’s 
Question Time and at universities such as Trinity College 
Dublin. Despite polling well in some local and European 
elections, the BNP has yet to achieve a wider electoral 
breakthrough. Commentators note that a dearth of activism 
and money has dashed its hopes in the 2011 elections, and 
that the party has failed to connect with constituents beyond 
older, less educated voters.101
casaPound italia, italy 102
CasaPound Italia is a prominent far-right youth street 
organisation in Italy that takes its name from the American 
expatriate and prolific author Ezra Pound, a defender of 
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the sovereignty-eroding aspirations of the European 
Union — and explicitly renounces the idea of Denmark as a 
multiethnic society: ‘Denmark is not an immigrant-country 
and never has been.’ 105
While Denmark once recognised a right to asylum 
on humanitarian grounds — 60 per cent of applications for 
which were once approved — DPP-backed immigration policy 
replaced that provision with the bare minimum required 
by the Geneva Conventions. It also cut social benefits to 
refugees by 30–40 per cent and imposed demanding new 
financial conditions on whether one could bring a non-
Danish spouse into Denmark, causing many Danes to live 
across the border in Sweden with their foreign spouses and 
commute across the Oeresund Bride to Denmark each day. 
In response to Swedish criticism of such isolationist reforms, 
Danish People’s Party leader and cofounder Pia Kjaersgaard 
responded: ‘If they want to turn Stockholm, Gothenburg or 
Malmo into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honour 
killings and gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a 
barrier on the Oeresund Bridge.’106
The party play on their anti-establishment image and 
their main line is that ordinary people have been abandoned 
by privileged, elitist politicians. The Danish People’s 
Party favours a strong welfare state for Danes, including 
an equality-assuring educational system that teaches 
practical skills in addition to instilling appreciation for and 
knowledge of Danish history, culture, and language. Public 
financing of healthcare, especially for vulnerable members 
of the community such as the elderly, is considered morally 
essential. In this way, the Danish People’s Party familiarly 
blends strong nationalist and social conservative positions 
with left-wing economic policies.
The Danish People’s Party has a separate youth branch, 
also established in 1995, shortly after the main party was 
established. In 2002 it was recorded as having 688 members, 
but there has been no public update on this figure.107 There 
has been a history of crossover in membership between DF 
Ungdom and other more extreme street-based movements 
by the housing crisis, and invaded the set of Big Brother 
to emphasise the misuse of housing resources. Casting 
themselves as ‘Third Millenium Fascists,’ members 
emphasise their ties to Mussolini’s ideology while 
simultaneously presenting themselves as serious contributors 
to contemporary political discourse and policy reform. 
CasaPound Italia has been extremely successful at mobilising 
poor, angry, white Italians. Ties are numerous between 
CasaPound Italia and established party apparatuses and 
continue to solidify and extend; the editor of the CasaPound 
Italia ‘fanzine’ Noise 451 is the son of one of the former 
leaders of the far right-wing political party Terza Posicione.
Dansk Folkeparti (‘Danish People’s Party’), Denmark
The Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) is the third largest 
political party in Denmark. It was founded in 1995, with Pia 
Kjærsgaard elected as its leader at their first national convention 
in 1996, and rose to prominence in 2001 as the Conservative 
People’s Party and Venstre (the Liberal Party) needed its 
support in order to form a majority government. Since that time, 
while not holding any cabinet-level positions, it has continued 
successfully to condition its support of the coalition advancement 
of its policy agenda. It wrote most of the immigration law 
endorsed by the coalition in 2002.103 It won 13.8 per cent of the 
vote in the 2007 parliamentary election, and it holds two seats 
in the European Parliament, with one of its members winning 
more votes in 2009 than any other candidate.
As stated in its party programme: 
The aim of the Danish People’s Party is to assert Denmark’s 
independence, to guarantee the freedom of the Danish people in 
their own country, and to preserve and promote representative 
government and the monarchy. 104 
 
It defends the independence of Denmark — from the 
threats of foreign cultures and what it takes to be 
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instance, it staged a protest outside the home of Muslim MEP 
Sajjad Karim, and journalists have accused EDL supporters of 
issuing death threats.115 Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik is 
believed to have been a supporter of the EDL, having joined 
the group’s Facebook page, though the EDL denies any and all 
links with Breivik and decries acts of terrorism.116
Front National (‘National Front’), France
The Front National (FN) was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie 
Le Pen.117 Le Pen was a divisive figure, infamous for his 
dismissive comments about the Holocaust and holding 
numerous convictions for racism and anti-Semitism. His 
support came from a mixed group of conservative Catholics, 
supporters of the Vichy regime and protest voters.118 Le Pen 
achieved electoral success in 2002 when he beat the then 
Socialist prime minister to enter the second round of the 
French presidential elections.119 But his support collapsed after 
2002, and he came fourth in the 2007 presidential elections, 
receiving only 10.4 per cent of the vote.120
In 2010 the FN made a surprise comeback in the regional 
elections,121 and gained further support when Le Pen stepped 
down and his daughter, Marine Le Pen, was elected as the 
new leader of the party earlier this year. She has embarked 
on a process of detoxifying the party, styling herself as a 
defender of the republic and the welfare state and strenuously 
denying anti-Semitism.122
Marine Le Pen has refocused the party onto the issues 
of immigration and Islam. She describes her position on 
immigration in France as ‘nothing to do with racism, it’s an 
economic problem’. She protests at the ‘Islamification’ of 
France and says that she wants to defend republican values, 
feminism and secularism from Muslim extremists. She 
argues that everyone in France should be made to adhere to 
French laws and principles, and claims that, while Islam is 
compatible with Western values, Sharia law is not. She also 
opposes free-market capitalism and globalisation, and wants 
France to pull out of the Euro.123
such as White Pride and Combat 18.108 DF Ungdom refused a 
request for an interview as part of this project on the grounds 
that it did not want to be associated with street-based 
movements like the EDL.
english Defence league, uK
The English Defence League (EDL) was formed of the United 
Peoples of Luton, which itself was created in 2009 in response 
to a protest against the Royal Anglian Regiment by the 
Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun.109 The key issue for the EDL, 
much like the BNP, is the sense that British national identity 
is at risk of being permanently corrupted by Islamic influence. 
The EDL is overtly anti-Islam and it staunchly opposes the 
implementation and influence of Sharia law in British society.110 
While it publicly promotes an image of liberalism, inclusion 
and tolerance, chants heard at its marches or language used at 
in its chat rooms sometimes suggests otherwise.
It bills itself as a ‘human rights organisation’ which stands 
opposed to the ‘religiously-inspired intolerance and barbarity’ 
of some segments of the Muslim community, including 
‘denigration and oppression of women, the molestation of 
young children, the committing of so-called honour killings, 
homophobia, anti-Semitism, and continued support for those 
responsible for terrorist atrocities’.111 Two current campaigns 
include introducing stricter regulations for halal meat and 
ending the construction of mosques in England.112
The EDL is not a political party, though according to 
group leader Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, it apparently has some 
electoral aspirations.113 It does not have strict membership 
guidelines, but has a formidable online presence. The EDL has 
divisions for Jewish, gay, Sikh and female supporters.114 There 
are national, regional and local divisions, along with sister 
organisations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The EDL is no stranger to controversy, and its marches 
and demonstrations frequently attract a large police presence 
and sometimes thousands of anti-fascist counter-protestors. It 
has frequently been accused of using intimidating tactics; for 
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on charges of discrimination and inciting hatred against 
Muslims, but was found not guilty.135
Die Freiheit (‘Freedom’), germany
The German group Die Freiheit was founded in October 
2010 and is led by René Stadtkewitz, a former member of the 
Christian Democrats.136 The party’s slogan is ‘The party for 
more freedom and democracy’.137 Stadtkewitz is an admirer 
of Geert Wilders, and aims to achieve with Die Freiheit what 
Wilders has achieved with the PVV in the Netherlands. He is 
described by Der Spiegel as ‘the German Geert Wilders’.138
Stadtkewitz is a virulent critic of Islam. He describes 
his decision to lead a protest movement in 2005 against the 
building of a mosque in Berlin as a life-changing moment. 
He distinguishes between Muslims, Islam as a religion, and 
Islam as a political ideology; it is the latter that he attacks, 
describing it as dangerous.139 The party opposes ‘Islamisation’ 
and expresses support for Israel.140
Die Freiheit’s programme supports the introduction of 
a Swiss-style direct democracy, welfare reform focused on 
community work and lower taxes. It is critical of the EU and 
the Eurozone rescue. It advocates a freeze on immigration and 
a reform of integration policy, maintaining all immigration 
must be stopped until immigrants comply with liberal values 
such as freedom of expression.141 In late 2010 Stadtkewitz 
visited Israel with representatives from the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs, Vlaams Belang and the Sweden Democrats.142 
There they issued the ‘Jerusalem Declaration’, a statement 
arguing for the protection of Western Judeo-Christian values 
from Islamic fundamentalism.143
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs  
(‘austria Freedom Party’), austria
The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ; Austrian Freedom 
Party) was founded in 1956, but rose to prominence in the 
1980s as it formed a coalition government with the Social 
Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(‘Dutch Party for Freedom’), The Netherlands
Charismatic leader Geert Wilders, formerly a member of  
the centre-right Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
(VVD; People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), founded 
the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in 2004.124 In 2006 it 
won nine out of 150 seats in the Dutch parliament. In 2010 
it won 24 seats, more than the Christian Democrats, and, 
while not a formal member of the current coalition, the 
Dutch Government relies on the PVV for support. Recent 
polls show the PVV almost level with the VVD, the leading 
partner in the coalition.125
Central to the programme of the PVV is immigration 
policy. Wilders has claimed there is a direct connection 
between immigration and problems with welfare, 
infrastructure, housing and transport.126 The party focuses 
its attacks on Muslim immigration. It wants an end to 
immigration from Islamic countries, all Muslim criminals 
deported and others paid to leave.127 Further policies include 
the banning of mosques and Islamic schools128 and the 
introduction of a tax on headscarves. The party opposes the 
EU, claiming that the European constitution undermines 
national sovereignty, and is against development aid.129 On 
economic policy it holds a populist position, arguing for more 
spending but lower taxes.130
Wilders has achieved notoriety for his incendiary 
comments on Islam. He has called for a ban on the Koran, 
describing it as the ‘Islamic Mein Kampf’,131 and has claimed 
that nearly all terrorists are Muslims. Wilders portrays 
himself as a moderate, and distances himself from the Front 
National, the Austrian Freedom Party and far-right groups 
in Italy.132 He styles his critique of Islam as a defence of 
human rights, questioning Islam’s stance on women’s rights 
and gay rights, and saying that he is only ‘intolerant of the 
intolerant’.133 He makes a distinction between Muslims  
and the ideology of Islam, saying, ‘I don’t hate Muslims.  
I hate their book and their ideology.’134 As a consequence 
of such statements, he was taken to court at the end of 2010 
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advocates smaller government, economic liberalisation and 
individual liberty, while also placing strong emphasis on the 
need to address immigration.145
In recent years the FrP has experienced a steady growth 
in public support and considerable electoral success. In the 
2005 parliamentary elections, it became Norway’s second 
largest party, winning 38 out of 169 seats. In 2009, it increased 
its share of the vote to 22.9 per cent — its best result to date.146 
Its membership has also doubled over the past decade to reach 
approximately 27,000.147
The party and its views on immigration have recently 
been thrown into the media spotlight following the 
revelation that Anders Breivik — perpetrator of Norway’s 
July 2011 killings — had at one time been a member.148 
Ms Siv Jensen, leader of the FrP since 2006, has been 
quick to distance the party from Breivik, stating that it is 
‘embarrassed, disgusted and truly sad that Anders Breivik 
was once a member’.149 However, she has concurrently 
emphasised the need for continued debate on immigration, 
integration and radical Islam.150
The FrP has taken a tough stance on these issues, calling 
for a decrease in the number of immigrants permitted into 
Norway and stressing the need for their assimilation into 
Norwegian society.151 It has also warned against the danger of 
‘sneak-Islamisation’ and objected to special measures being 
taken to accommodate Islamic beliefs and traditions.152 The 
party, however, adamantly denies that it is either anti-Islamic 
or that it promotes a far-right agenda.153 It has downplayed 
similarities with what it considers to be extremist Nordic 
parties, saying of the Sweden Democrats: ‘the Progress Party 
sees no reason to ally itself with that party, and we have very 
little in common with them.’154
Despite the FrP’s insistence that it forms part of the 
political mainstream, Norway’s other opposition parties have 
historically refused to cooperate with it. There are, however, 
indications that this attitude may be changing — increasing 
the likelihood that the party could form part of a coalition 
government after the 2013 parliamentary elections.155
Democratic Party. The peak of its political success was in 1999, 
when it won 26.9 per cent of the national vote and entered 
a coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party. 
Citizens were unimpressed by FPÖ governance, however, and 
it won a mere 10 per cent of votes in the 2002 election. While 
the People’s Party agreed to sustain their alliance, influential 
FPÖ members left the party to form their own Alliance for the 
Future of Austria, which took the FPÖ’s place.
The FPÖ’s disastrous reign in power was largely the 
result of a backlash from other European nations, which 
imposed sanctions on Austria because of the FPÖ’s rabid 
anti-EU and anti-multicultural agenda: ‘[T]he admission 
of the FPÖ into a coalition government’, announced the 
European Union, ‘legitimises the extreme right in Europe.’ 
Moreover, working-class supporters were unhappy that the 
FPÖ backtracked on some of its protectionist economic 
promises to support the People’s Party’s agenda, exacerbating 
fissures within the party.
The FPÖ’s economic policies tend to be libertarian, 
favouring lower taxes and privatisation, and advocating for 
less government intervention in the market. It emphasises 
citizens’ control over their government by encouraging 
referenda and the direct election of the president. Warning 
against rising Islamisation, the FPÖ’s slogan was once ‘Austria 
First’, advocating the importance of restricting immigration 
and preserving traditional Austrian culture. In autumn 2011 
FPÖ is polling extremely closely to the other major parties, 
whom FPÖ leader Heinz Christian Strache hopes to compete 
against during the next election in 2013.144
Fremskrittspartiet  
(‘Norwegian Progress Party’), Norway
The Fremskrittspartiet (FrP; Norwegian Progress Party) was 
founded by Anders Lange in 1973. Initially named Anders 
Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and 
Public Intervention, it was established on a relatively narrow 
anti-tax and anti-bureaucracy platform. Today the FrP 
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Italian culture, disparages the unified Italian flag, and 
foments distrust of Rome.
Despite its reputation, the League has long officially 
resisted any ascription of anti-minority sentiments, rejecting 
vehemently an article in 1992 that classified it alongside 
parties like Marine le Pen’s Front National and the Austrian 
Freedom Party.159 The party is eager to remind Italians  
that the first black mayor in Italy is a member of the League, 
and that one of its coordinators is a Muslim-raised  
Tunisian immigrant.
Perussuomalaiset (‘True Finns’), Finland
The True Finns, founded in 1995 as a spin-off group of the 
dissolved Finnish Rural Party, received 19 per cent of the votes 
in the most recent parliamentary elections in April 2011. While 
their rise was aided by an electoral scandal that sidetracked 
the major parties, their success is unmistakably linked to the 
populist attraction toward their fundamental message: why 
should fiscally responsible northerners be forced to subsidise 
the reckless budgetary antics of unscrupulous and incompetent 
southerners?160 The True Finns constitute the political home of 
Finnish euroscepticism, railing against European integration 
and bailouts of southern European states. Much to the relief of 
Eurozone bureaucrats and supporters, eager to assure investors 
that populist movements weren’t going to derail Europe’s 
commitment to pay its bills once elected to government, the 
True Finns were excluded from the coalition that formed 
several months ago.161
Like other Scandinavian populist movements, the True 
Finns defy the traditional left–right dichotomy, uniting 
left-wing economic policies with right-wing social policies. 
Its support for a robust welfare state accounts for why the 
Finns are seated at the centre-left position in the Finnish 
Parliament. True Finns oppose same-sex marriage and 
adoption, and advocate a much more nationalist array of 
educational policies, wanting students to learn less Swedish 
and more about traditional Finnish values. Their immigration 
lega Nord (‘Northern league’), italy
The Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania (Northern 
League for the Independence of Padania) is a crucial 
coalition partner with Il Popolo della Libertà (the Party 
of Freedom) in the current government of Premier Silvio 
Berlusconi. It galvanised political support in the early 
1990s through its vocal denunciation of corruption scandals 
in Rome. Support for Lega Nord rose from 5.7 per cent 
of the national vote in 2005 to 12.7 per cent in 2010.156 It 
holds 85 of 945 seats in Parliament. While Lega Nord’s 
most fundamental aim is the independence — or at least 
increased autonomy — of northern Italy, its initially one-issue 
regionalist agenda has expanded to include a broader array 
of political objectives. While it initially favoured same-sex 
marriage and legalised marijuana, it has moved rightward on 
social issues over the past decade and now opposes abortion, 
same-sex marriage, stem cell research and euthanasia. 
It fuses social conservatism with a moderate economic 
libertarianism, opposing government intervention in the free 
market and advocating generally for low taxes, especially for 
private citizens and small business entrepreneurs. Lega Nord 
was a vocal critic of bank bailouts in Italy.
Lega Nord is widely criticised in Italy for being racist 
and xenophobic. It insists that these perceptions rest on 
misunderstandings of its tough-on-crime policies, particularly 
its opposition to illegal immigration. Lega Nord has incurred 
the ire of human rights organisations concerned about party 
leader Umberto Bossi’s suggestion that the Italian navy fire 
on all boats with illegal immigrants heading for the Italian 
coast.157 (Incendiary comments from Bossi are familiar fodder 
for the Italian press; Bossi once suggested that violence 
ought be deployed against leftists in response to their alleged 
attempts to rig ballots in Italy.158) Factions in Lega Nord 
emphasise the significance of counterbalancing Muslim 
immigration by encouraging increased immigration from 
Christian countries in order to maintain Italy’s Christian 
heritage. The concern for sustaining the status quo is even 
more parochial: Lega Nord regularly criticises southern 
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granted to indigenous Sami in northern Sweden. The group 
is broadly socially conservative, tending to oppose adoption 
rights for same-sex couples, though members have invoked 
the welfare of sexual minorities as a reason to resist increased 
‘Islamisation’.
The Sweden Democrats, whom several Swedish papers 
have banned from advertising because of their allegedly 
hate-mongering agenda, have over the past few years injected 
themselves into the broader European discussion over Islam, 
immigration and multiculturalism. After the Danish cartoon 
crisis inspired a boycott of Danish products across the 
Middle East, the Sweden Democrats organised a campaign 
to encourage the purchase of such products. It also ran its 
own cartoon on its website, depicting a faceless Muhammad, 
which government ministers allegedly ordered the internet 
service provider to remove, costing one minister his job. 
The cartoon prompted hate speech charges against the 
Sweden Democrats. More recently, the Sweden Democrats 
received press in relation to the Norwegian massacre, as a 
member implied there was Muslim involvement before the 
revelation of the shooter’s identity. After the killer’s identity 
was revealed, the comments nevertheless continued. ‘Breivik 
is a product of the multicultural society,’ announced Sweden 
Democrat MP Erik Hellsborn. ‘If Europe had not become 
multicultural then the shootings would not have happened.’163 
The Sweden Democrats have not officially endorsed these 
comments, which feed the perception among leftists that the 
party is fundamentally Islamophobic and xenophobic.
Vlaams Belang (‘Flemish interest’), Belgium
Led by Bruno Valkeniers, Vlaams Belang is an anti-Islam party 
seeking independence for Flanders. It has connections to the 
Front National, Lega Nord and the Austrian Freedom Party.164 
The party was established in 2004 after Belgian judges ruled its 
predecessor, Vlaams Bloc, was a ‘racist’ organisation, resulting 
in a loss of state funding and its subsequent reformation. It 
had been reported that Vlaams Bloc was a party of ‘skinheads, 
policy, one of their showcase agendas, centres on proposals 
to deport immigrants who have committed crimes; to take 
no more refugees than required by quotas; but also to permit 
immigrants who have a clean criminal record, knowledge of 
Finnish language, and steady employment to become Finnish 
nationals after five years.
Timo Soini, the True Finns’ leader, was the party’s 
presidential candidate in 2006, and today is a popular 
member of the European Parliament — elected with the 
highest vote share of any candidate in Finland.
sverigedemokraterna (‘sweden Democrats’), sweden
The Sverigedemokraterna (SD; Sweden Democrats) were 
founded in 1988, but only received the requisite number of 
votes to receive representation in the Swedish Parliament in 
2010, polling 5.7 per cent.162 While the group was initially 
accused of having Nazi ties, and drew inspiration from groups 
like Front National, it pursued a strategy of moderation 
during the 1990s that widened its appeal and even persuaded a 
member of the Moderate Party to switch parties. Nevertheless 
the Swedish prime minister has refused to invite the Sweden 
Democrats into government, intent that the centre-right not 
become dependent for its political success on the polarising 
agenda of the far-right. The Sweden Democrats view their 
2010 victory as an opportunity to make their voice heard 
throughout the country; many Swedes were shocked by the 
victory, which has forced discontent over immigration into the 
foreground of public discourse.
The Sweden Democrats contend that excessive 
immigration has crippled Swedish solidarity, straining 
economic and social relations among citizens. They claim 
that their slogan — ‘Keep Sweden Swedish’ — is not about 
racism but the rejection of multiculturalism. Contending that 
Sweden’s integration policy has failed, the Sweden Democrats 
advocate heavy restrictions on immigration and incentives for 
current immigrants to return to their home countries. They 
have expressed scepticism about the special group rights 
111Annex 2
Nazi collaborators and white supremacists’.165 Vlaams Belang 
has since moderated its rhetoric and softened its policy on 
immigration. In the 2007 election, it won nearly 20 per cent 
of the vote in Flanders. Support, however, has fallen recently 
on the increase in the vote for the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
(N-VA; New Flemish Alliance), a more moderate pro-
independence party.166
The party describes itself as nationalist and on the 
right. It advocates the dissolution of the Belgian state and 
the independence of Flanders, arguing that the stalemate in 
the Belgian government is a result of the cultural differences 
between Flemings and Walloons. It argues for ‘Flemish 
money in Flemish hands’, opposing the transfer of wealth 
from Flanders to Wallonia, which it estimates costs the 
Flemish people over €12 billion each year.167
On immigration, the party supports strict controls 
and the abolition of the naturalisation law.168 It wants to 
transform schools with high proportions of Muslims into 
integration schools, where classes focus on language, 
European norms and values.169 It also argues for a ‘re-
migration’ policy for those Muslims who do not accept 
Western values such as women’s rights and freedom of 
speech. In other areas, Vlaams Belang has a zero tolerance 
approach to crime and opposes a European federal state.170
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